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THESIS ABSTRACT 
By Kathleen Ducn-Sandberg 
The controversial damming of the Delaware River at Tocks Island, authorized by 
Congress in 1962, would have created a 37 mile-long reservoir or man-made recreational lake. Tn 
preparation, fifteen thousand people were displaced. Victims of social engineering fought the 
project for nearly forty years before Congress finally deauthorized it. 
Richard Albert wrote the only history of the dam and creation of the surrounding national 
park. Before he died in 2009, he admitted he gave the environmental movement too much credit 
for stopping the dam. My argument is that time and money were actually the most significant 
factors affecting the demise of the dam. Had the first shovel of soil been turned in 1967, the 
project might have moved ahead. An examination of LBJ's federal budgets and subsequent 
allocations indicates projects that were already started, continued to receive funding. During this 
critical window of time, a continued reduction of hnding due to inflation and spending for the 
Vietnam War coupled with skyrocketing project costs, made Tocks Island Dam a low fimding 
priority and continuously staEled project. 
Tocks Island Dam needed to be placed into the broader context of state and national 
history, especially the political and economic aspects of both. Major environmental opposition to 
the dam did not start until aAer 1970, and after the environmental movement itself started to 
attract widespread attention. 
The focus of my thesis is the history of the dam's controversial demise. The Tocks Island 
Dam project's final demise has been viewed as a victory far environmentalists, but this project 
was actually doomed much earlier when President Johnson needed money to simultaneously 
fight the War in Vietnam and push through his Great Society legislation. As early as 1967, Erne 
Magazine criticized the dam's costs, but it was a lucrative "pork barrel" project and lingered. 
Cost increases and budget cuts due to the war delayed the project which got tangled in later 
environmental legislation. My thesis demonstrates that a lack of fbnding in the late 1960s handed 
the growing environmental movement a later victory in the 1970s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The controversial damming of the Delaware River at Tocks Island, authorized by 
Congress in 1962, would have created a 37 mile-long reservoir for water, power and flood 
control north of the Delaware Water Gap. Viewed by many to be a good idea at the time, the 
Tocks Island Dam would have destroyed approximately 12,000 acres of woodlands, virtually 
most of the Minisink Valley, and left many very old and historic landmarks underwater. In 
preparation for this engineering feat, the Army Corps of Engineers displaced fifteen thousand 
people, wiped out several entire towns, large farms, historic roads and the Minisink Flats. All 
were either razed or abandoned. These homes and places of historic interest were doomed to 
become the bed of a new man-made lake surrounded by the 72,000 acre Delaware Water Gap 
National Recreation Area, created by a another bill signed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 
The earth and rock-filled dam was to be built at Tocks Island, a small uninhabited island 
in the middle of the Delaware River about five miles north of the Delaware Water Gap. It was to 
be 160 feet high and 3,000 feet long. It would have provided approximately 980 cubic feet of 
water per second to be used for hydroelectric power and as a water source. Congress had also 
authorized the construction of a nearby pumped-storage facility at Sunfish Pond, which would 
have been owned and operated by private power companies, that was expected to generate an 
estimated 1,300 megawatts of hydroelectric power. Another controversial component of the 
project was the establishment of a recreation area surrounding the Tocks site to be run by the 
National Park Service. ' 
Richard C. Albert, Damming the Delaware: The Rise and Fall of Tocks Island Dam, (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1987 and 2005), pgs. 1-3. 
"The overriding decision to dam or not to dam the Minisink must be weighed against its 
natural, social and historic heritage," wrote Nancy Shukaitis, former Commissioner of the Four 
County Task Force on Tocks Island Dam and longtime resident of the area.' She and countless 
others fought the dam project for nearly ten years before the Delaware River Basin Commission 
finally voted to terminate the project, which had an estimated price tag that had grown from $90 
to more than $400 million 
By then it was too late. Bushkill and Dingmans Feny had become ghost towns and 
Walpack's population dropped from 384 to 67. People lost their homes, their livelihoods and 
their heritage. Park records show 10,000 properties, many belonging to generations of families as 
far back as the colonial period, were bought or condemned. More than 3,000 homes occupied by 
8,000 people were razed, 25 summer camps, 125 farms and more than 100 businesses, seven 
churches and three schools were all demolished or abandoned.' Since then, many historic 
landmarks on both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania sides of the river that managed to survive 
have languished under the care of the National Park Service because of a lack of funding for 
maintenance and restoration. In 2003 the Park Service encouraged former residents, who were 
displaced when the park was created, to come back to live and refbrbish their own homes and 
pay rent. Judy Peet, a reporter for the Newark Star Ledger wrote: 
Instead, the plan revived the anger and despair felt by homeowners who were 
booted out nearly forty years ago when government men descended on the valley 
-- some say like storm troopers, others say like locusts -- to create the $1 billion 
Tocks Island ~ a r n . ~  
The emotionally charged environmental reasons for stopping the Tocks Island Dam were a direct 
result of the media attention focused on the residents displaced from their homes who joined 
"ennis Bertland et al, eds., The Minisink: A Chronicle of One of America's First and Last Frontier: (The Four County 
Task Force on the Tocks Island Dam Project, 1975)) preface vii. 
Judy Peet, A Bitterness Runs Through It, The Star Ledger, 23 November, 2003, p.19. 
lbid. 
forces with any group they hoped would hrther their cause and condemn what was being done to 
them by the Army Corps of Engineers and in effect, the federal government. This attention 
happened at the same time and should be considered a part of the budding "Environmental 
Movement" that was taking shape in the late 1960s and 1970s. This movement changed pubic 
thinking about our natural resources from protective conservationism to pro-active 
environmentalism, which resulted in the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act and the 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency a year later. 
Before these federal laws were enacted and while public environmental consciousness 
was still being raised, the stories emanating from Tocks Island made great press, especially for 
nearby urban reporters, who got to take a field trip out to Sussex or Monroe County for the day 
to cover an easy "hearts and flowers" story, myself included. Television cameras captured sound 
bites from protesting angry residents and Hippie environmentalists who joined them like 
sympathetic union strikers as they hugged each other and demonstrated with signs. The 
atmosphere was a mixture of hneral-like mourning and tension. "It was like going to someone's 
wake," described attorney Donald Stieh, now president of the Walpack Historical Society, whose 
family lost their vacation home. "I think if a member of the Park Service had wandered onto the 
scene, there might have been a lynching."' 
Richard Albert was a restoration scientist with the Delaware Riverkeeper Network, a 
nonprofit environmental organization that fights proposed dam projects. He previously worked 
for the Delaware River Basin Commission, the federal agency charged with building Tocks 
Island Dam. Before he died in 2009, Albert wrote the only history of the Tocks Island Dam and 
creation of the surrounding national park. He said like many others, he had a change of heart 
about saving the Delaware River, but admitted he gave the environmental movement too much 
5 Donald Steih, Interviewed by Kathleen Duca-Sandberg, September, 2010. 
3 
credit for stopping the dam. Albert said the volume of research materials he used was large 
complex "and usually biased." 
"Far anybody who wasn't there at the time, it's hard to imagine the agony people 
went through, and for what?'said Albert. "A dam on a river that didn't need it? 
Recreation that was already there? Farmland that the government now leases out? 
Or for historic homes that the government can't afford to keep? I offer no apology 
except to recognize that many subjects touched on could have been explored in 
greater detail. A subject for which I would like to see additional professional 
study is the striking parallels between Tocks Idand Dam and the Vietnam war."' 
How the proposed dam affected local residents and budding environmentalists is only one 
aspect of the history of the dam and as sad or news worthy a story as it was, Tocks Island needs 
to be placed into the broader context of state and national history, especially the political and 
economic aspects of both. Major environmental opposition to the dam did not start until 1970, 
considered a late start because the environmental movement itself did not attract widespread 
attention until after the first Earth Day celebration was held that year and the "Save the Delaware 
Coalition" was organized. Ironically, the leaders of the coalition opposed the dam, but supported 
the creation of the recreation area, even though it tripled the amount of land to be confiscated by 
the government. The history of the project itself and the emotional effects of social engineering 
have been thoroughly written about by AIbert, who fifteen years later said, "Tn spite of all the 
real and imagined environmental impacts, it can be argued that the Tocks Tsland Dam was a 
victim of cost overruns and the Vietnam 
The focus of this thesis is the history of the dam's controversial demise. The Tocks Island 
Dam project became irrevocably log-gammed during the Carter Administration and its final 
Richard Albert, Interviewed by Kathleen Duca-Sandberg, March, 2008. 
7 
Richard Albert, In-Tocks-icated: The Tocks Island Dam Project, Cultural Resource Management-CRM (Published 
online by the National Park Service, Volume 25, Issue 03,2002) http://crm.cr.npagov/archive/25-03/25-03-3.pdf 
demise was viewed as a victory for environmentalists, but this project was actually doomed 
much earlier when President Johnson needed money to simultaneously fight the War in Vietnam 
and push through his Great Society legislation. The project had enormous cost overruns from the 
very beginning. As early as 1967, Time Magmine criticized these costs and recommended that 
Congress kill the project, but it was a lucrative "pork barrel" project and lingered. Cost increases 
and budget cuts due to the war delayed construction and allowed the project to get tangled in 
later environmental legislation. My thesis demonstrates that a lack of funding in the late 1960s 
handed the growing environmental movement a later victory in the 1970s. 
CHAPTER I 
The Historic Minisink Valley 
The Upper Delaware River Valley, known as the Minisink, encompasses four counties in 
two states: Sussex and Warren in New Jersey and Pike and Monroe in Pennsylvania. It stretches 
for forty miles on either side of the Delaware River from the Delaware Water Gap to Port Jervis, 
New York and is bordered by small mountain ranges on either side, the Kittatinny in New Jersey 
and the Poconos in Pennsylvania. The Delaware River flows from ancient glacial sources in the 
Catskill Mountains in New York and empties into the Delaware Bay below Wilmington, 
Delaware. 
Before the first Europeans explored or attempted to settle the Delaware River Valley the 
most prevalent tribe of Indians to occupy this territory were the Lenape, a branch of the 
Algonquian nation. Many historians have documented that Henry Hudson, sailing for the Dutch 
West India Company, was the first European to inadvertently discover the Delaware River in 
1609, as well as the Hudson River, during his explorations to find a water route to China. 
However, he did not sail up the Delaware River and stayed in the vicinity of what now is known 
as Delaware Bay. The land was claimed by the Dutch and called New Netherland. There are 
conflicting accounts of attempted Dutch settlements in the area known as the Minisink Valley 
prior to 1664 when the English gained control of what became the New York and New Jersey 
colonies. Early Dutch copper mining remains somewhat of a legend as there is little evidence 
left today of these alleged mine sites, only a few openings where they could have possibly used a 
pick and wedge technique to mine copper north of Tocks Island and haul the ore a distance of 
104 miles to "Esopus" on the Hudson, present day Kingston, New York, for shipment abroad. " 
During the colonial period most of this area was owned by members of the West Jersey 
Proprietors. Arty possible claims to land by remaining Indians were disregarded. Some of the 
houses built by early settlers served as forts and there are many accounts of Indians raids and 
massacres during the French and Indian War. In the summer of 1755 the Minisink Indians 
attempted to retake their former lands on both sides of the river. For several years the Indians 
raided homes and farms all along the Delaware, killing and scalping men, women and children 
and burning their houses and barns. Similar attacks took place throughout the river valley until 
1763. Numerous attempted copper mining operations in the lath century all failed and by the late 
1800s the Pahaquarry Mining Company, the last mining operation, closed. A 1944 geology 
report on the minerals in the Pahaquarry mines concluded the principal mineral available in 
abundance was a low grade copper sulfide, a mineral hardly worth the effort and expense to 
mine. The site of these abandoned copper mines was eventually taken over by the Boy Scouts 
and turned into Camp Pahaquarra that operated until the Army Corps of Engineers forced them 
to close in 1969 in preparation for the Tocks Island ~ a r n . ~  
Henry Charlton Beck, The Roads of Home, Lanes and Legends of New Jersey, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1987), p. 8. In The Roads of Home, Lanes and Legends of New Jersey by Henry Charlton Beck, he cited an 
1787 interview in Hazard's Register with area resident Nicholas Dupius, who said there was a company of Dutch 
miners from New York who operated the Pahaquarry mines and built about one hundred miles of road, (now Old 
Mine Road) in the 17"' Century, while later historians, Herbert Kraft and Peter 0. Wacker, who have studied the 
area extensively, disagree that European settlement in the area could not have occurred until much later because 
Native American hostility made settlement nearly impossible for such early Dutch settlement. 
Peter 0. Wacker, NewJerseyls Cultural Resources A. D. 1660- 1810,(New Jersey DEP, Historic Preservation Office, 
22, January, 2010 www.nj.gov/dep/hpo/ .../pg 199~NJCulturalResourc1660~1810Wacker.pdf), pgs. 199 - 204. 
Peter 0. Wacker, Land and PeoplerA Cultural Geography of Preindustrial New Jersey (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1975), pgs. 234-235. 
Herbert C. Kraft, The Dutch, the Indians and the Quest for Copper: Pahaquarry and the Old Mine Road, (South 
Orange, Seton Hall University Museum, 1996), p. 91 
9 Bertrand, p. 42 
The Minisink Valley saw military activity in both the French & Indian and Revolutionary 
Wars. In 1763, during the French and Indian War, the Van Campen house sheltered 150 people 
from the threat of Indian attack and in December 1776, General Gates stayed there with his 
colonial troops enroute to Trenton. In 1778 Brig. General Casimir Pulaski, a Polish 
Revolutionary soldier, brought 250 cavalrymen down the Old Mine Road and wintered there for 
two months A large majority of the 13,000 colonists who lived in the area were Patriot 
supporters of the Re~olution. '~ 
Despite the failed attempts at mining, settlement continued and the Old Mine Road was 
used to haul wheat and other products to Kingston and the Delaware River was used for 
transportation and floating logs downriver to sawmills. Recent residents, the descendents of early 
settlers with names including, Rosencrans, Westbrook, Spangenburg, Hull, Decker, Losey, 
Depue, and Smith, trace their heritage to this area and these peop1e:These early settlers farmed, 
logged or worked for canals and railroads that were later built in the area. During the early days 
of the Industrial Revolution the Morris Canal was built across New Jersey, linking the Delaware 
River to the Hudson River. The canal enabled farmers to ship crops and farm products to city 
markets and it also fueled industry with coal fiom Pennsylvania, limestone and iron ore. 
The Search for Water 
It was shortly after the Revolutionary War that the problems of water supply for the 
region and navigation, energy, and flood-control issues of the Delaware River began. These 
issues were shared by New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and even Delaware, and led to more 
than two hundred years of disputes and poorly planned cooperative efforts, including the 
10 The National Park Service Website: www.nps.gov/dewa/historyculture/stories-tocks.htm 
8 
proposed Tocks Island Dam. The Delaware River supplied early merchants, farmers and loggers 
with an inexpensive way to transport goods to the markets of Easton, Trenton and Philadelphia. 
The river's numerous tributaries also allowed for essential transportation of goods and supplies 
as well. People were so dependent on these smaller streams and the Delaware River that in 1783 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania appointed commissioners to decide the ownership of each 
Delaware River island and Albert said it was declared the "whole length and breadth thereof, is 
and shall continue to be and remain a common highway, equally free and open for use, benefit 
and advantage of each state."" This meant that no one could build a dam across the Delaware 
River unless both sides agreed. It also meant that water could not be diverted fiom the river if the 
diversion substantially reduced river flows. 
The Industrial Revolution created a great need for coal to power manufacturing and 
transportation. Huge coal fields had been discovered in Pennsylvania and coal had to be 
transported downstream. In 1823, the 72 mile Lehigh Canal was opened and the Lehigh Coal and 
Navigation Company played a major role for years in keeping water-supply dams from being 
built on the Delaware River. Other canals were soon constructed: the Morris Canal from 
Phillipsburg to Jersey City; the Delaware Division of the Pennsylvania Canal from Easton to 
Bristol; the Delaware and Raritan Canal that spanned from Bordentown and Trenton to New 
Bnmswick, and the Delaware and Hudson Canal. The common destinations of these various 
canal systems were the industrial cities and terminal ports of New York City, Jersey City and 
Philadelphia. The Industrial Revolution of course led to huge population increases in these areas 
and an ever increasing need for potable water. 
As electricity replaced steam as a source of energy, New Jersey recognized the potential 
of the Delaware River for hydroelectric power (the use of water falls to drive turbines). In 1897, 
11 Albert, p. 5 
9 
the state legislature enacted a law allowing companies to be formed specifically for building 
hydroelectric dams. In 1902 the first hydropower project for the Delaware River was proposed 
by the Delaware Water Gap Power Company and the region north of the Delaware Water Gap 
was surveyed, including Tocks Island. 
In 1907, during the height of Teddy Roosevelt-style conservationism, the New York 
legislature authorized its Water Supply Commission to conduct flood control and power 
development studies, which recommended building three power dams along the upper Delaware 
River in New York. Concurrent with this study was the 1908 ThirdAm~zml Reporl qf the New 
York State FVater Commission, another study that considered building forty hydropower dams 
upstream from Port Jervis, including creating a series of Delaware River lakes that would each 
be from five to ten miles long that "would convert the region into a beautiful and attractive 
pleasure resort and greatly increase the land values."'* 
In 19 20, the New Jersey based Delaware River Improvement Company applied to the 
Pennsylvania Water Supply Commission for approval to build a hydroelectric dam near 
Belvidere. Not sure of its jurisdiction, the commission requested an opinion from the state's 
attorney general, who upheld the Treaty of 1783. Concurrent legislative action of both states 
would be necessary. By 1913, the Delaware River Development Company was incorporated to 
pursue the same project. This company spent eight years trying to get the project approved and 
bought land on both sides of the river, but it never overcame the obstacles of the Treaty of 1783. 
By the 1920s the lumber raRing industry on the DeIaware, which had been responsible 
for the New Jersey/Pennsylvania anti-dam treaty and was a great obstacle to using the Delaware 
River for hydropower, was dead. Interest in using the Delaware River as a water supply then 
became an over-riding concern. 
12 Albert, p. 8 
Finding adequate supplies of fresh clean water had long been a problem for the more 
populated areas of New York City and Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin left the city of 
Philadelphia money in his will to build a public water supply system and by 1850 a waterworks 
on the Schuykill River was supplying seven million gallons ofwater. Philadelphia's use of a 
Delaware River estuary at the Kensington works was also expanded until the Delaware River 
was providing fifty percent of Philadelphia's water supply. However, because of the growth in 
manufacturing and increased population, the water quality quickly became very poor as the city 
dumped unrestricted waste into the Schuykill and lower Delaware. Upstream pollution was also 
increasing from Port Jervis and hrther polluted Philadelphia's water supply. 
New York City had water supply problems almost fi-om the time Peter Minuit purchased 
Manhattan Island from the Indians in 1626. Diseases, including yellow fever, cholera and 
typhoid fever were attributed to contaminated water and there was an inadequate supply of water 
to fight fires. Historian Charles Weidner wrote: 
As the city built up and the density of the population increased, numerous wells 
became polluted with the seepage of privies, cesspools, and the drainage from the 
streets. As early as 1750 the water was notoriously foul. l3 
Manhattan Island's early water supply came from "the Collect" a spring-fed, fi-esh-water 
pond that extended from Pearl Street to Franklin Street, an area of about 48 acres. It supplied 
mostly polluted water to Manhattan's inhabitants, who at this time were crowded in the lower 
end of the island. By 1774, the city moved to construct a municipally owned water supply 
system, in the form of a well that would supply water to a reservoir on Broadway between Pearl 
and White Streets powered by a steam engine that would distribute the water by pipe throughout 
13 Charles H. Weidner, Water for a City: a History of New Yofk City's Problem From the Beginning to  the Delaware 
River System, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974) p.14 
the city. The supply proved to be insuficient and the quality of the water was again, very poor. 
As a result the project was abandoned. Between 1785 and 1798 numerous plans, most involving 
the Collect as a main source were considered and rejected by the Common Council. 
In 1799 the New York State Legislature passed "an act for supplying the City of New 
York with pure and wholesome water." The Common Council accepted this bill with reluctance 
because authority over the City's water was given to a private corporation, a bank, the Manhattan 
Company, incorporated by Assemblyman Aaron Burr. The Manhattan Company had complete 
control over the City's water supply and had a mandate to solve the supply problem within ten 
years However, banking turned out to be a more profitable undertaking for Burr and little was 
done except to lay 20 miles of wooden water mains that carried an unfit and inadequate supply of 
water to less than a third of the City's population of over 200,000. The other two thirds of the 
city still depended on wells or other sources for water. There was no citywide sewer system and 
scientists estimated one hundred tons of human excrement was being put into the porous soil of 
lower Manhattan Island daily. In addition, there was seepage fiom graveyards and the drainage 
fiom stables and the filthy streets. Weidner noted: "The stench arising from the streets was 
appalling."1" 
A devastating fire in 1835 forced the city to build a reservoir in the Croton watershed in 
Westchester County. A forty-two mile aqueduct, receiving reservoirs and other parts of a water- 
distribution system were built, yet it only took six years before this system became too small to 
meet water demands. The system was expanded continuously and still exists today During the 
period of heavy immigration fiom Europe between 1850 and 1900, the city's population grew 
from a half-million to three and a half million with more than 135,000 people moving into the 
city each year. Consumption of water naturally increased. Users of this early system consumed 
14 Weidner, p. 23 
12 
an average of 20 gallons a day, but by 1895 the average daily use had increased to 145 gallons 
per day, because industrial and commercial use was included. Albert wrote: 
Philadelphia and New York had taken distinctly different approaches to solving 
their early water problems. Philadelphia had taken the least costly approach by 
tapping ample, nearby water sources. However, its water supplies had become 
grossly polluted. New York City had taken the bold approach of building 
reservoirs in distant areas and then bringing the water to its citizens. But the city's 
program could not keep pace with the tremendous growth in population and water 
consumption. 
Between 1907 and 1928 New York built the Catskill System, above the Hudson River 
connecting the Schoharie and Ashokan Reserviors by 144 miles of aqueducts, but even before it 
was completed, it was already determined to be inadequate. New York predicted it would run out 
of water by the mid 1930s. One of the most viable alternatives considered by the city's engineers 
was to develop watersheds on the Delaware River. The Pennsylvania Water and Power 
Resources Board also conducted a study that concluded a dam across the Delaware River at 
Walpack Bend would be an inexpensive way to solve Philadelphia's water supply needs. 
New Jersey also had growing water supply concerns. By 1900 more than two million 
people lived in the northern urban parts of the state and supplies were running low. The North 
Jersey Water Supply District began a series of studies beginning with the Hazen Study, which 
recommended construction of a reservoir on the Raritan River above Somerville that could be 
augmented by pumping water from the Delaware River into the Raritan near Clinton and 
building a pump station near Belvidere on the Delaware. The Long Hill project proposed 
building eight interconnected reservoirs on various Delaware River tributaries with the final 
stage of the project being a pump station near Walpack Bend not far from Tocks Island. Neither 
15 Albert, p. 13 
the Hazen nor the Long Hill projects were built. The ultimate solution to the water needs of 
North Jersey seemed to lead to the Delaware River. 
In 1923 the Delaware River Treaty Commission was created by legislative action in the 
three states. The commission's job was to negotiate an interstate agreement that would govern 
each state's water projects in the Delaware River Basin. Federal agencies were invited to 
participate as advisors. Staff of various state agencies, New York City, the Federal Power 
Commission and the United States Army Corps of Engineers, conducted work on drafting an 
interstate compact that they adopted on January 24, 1925, establishing the permanent regulatory 
Tri-State Delaware River Commission. The proposed compact stipulated Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey and New York share equally in the DeIaware River's water above Port Jervis and below 
that point, the Delaware was to be shared only by New Jersey and Penn~ylvania.'~ 
From the beginning, the three states ran into politically motivated obstacles while 
attempting to pass the compact bill. New Jersey amendments were rejected by Pennsylvania and 
the powerful and politically connected Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company lobbied vigorously 
against the bill's passage there. The company had been given water rights to the Lehigh River 
during the building of the Lehigh Canal 100 years earlier and wanted to keep its Philadelphia 
customers. New York State, who had the most to gain, passed the compact quickly. Even with 
amendments, the New Jersey legislature still hesitated to pass the bi11.17 
A newer and less ambitious compact was approved by the Commission in 1927, which 
gave each state an initial allocation of 600 million gallons of water per day. Again, New York 
passed the compact treaty quickly in 1927 and the bill again stalled in both Pennsylvania and in 
New Jersey. A focus of the debates was the amount of water flow that would be restricted below 
16 Albert, pgs. 15-17 
1 7  Albert, p. 18 
Port Jervis, and concerns the river would become a mere brook during the summer. Trenton was 
also concerned about the quality of the water that would flow down a restricted Delaware. The 
city had been experiencing pollution problems during low-flow periods when thunderstorms 
washed coal and industrial wastes out of the Lehigh River Valley. New Jersey Iegislators were 
very concerned about differences between state and commission engineers7 findings on the 
Trenton issue. When Pennsylvania would not agree to an increase in the minimum flow 
requirements, New Jersey killed the bill in 1928. 
The City of New York threatened to sue and made preparations to begin an independent 
water diversion project. New Jersey reacted immediately when the attorney general's office filed 
a lawsuit in the United States Supreme Court against New York State and New York City on 
May 20, 1929, to keep the city from diverting water out of the Delaware River Basin In this suit, 
New Jersey claimed New York's diversion would destroy the basin environmentally and claimed 
that the Secretary of War had to approve any diversions that would affect the river's navigability. 
They also cried that New York City's use of water was extravagant. 
On May 4th, 193 1, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes delivered the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, which affirmed New York's right to divert water fiom the Delaware based on a principle 
of equitable apportionment. He ruled each state in the Delaware River Basin had a right to a fair 
share of the water. New York was limited to taking 440 million gallons daily, but New York City 
was required to release from its holding reservoirs enough water to maintain a minimum flow at 
Port Jervis and Trenton. The ruling also stipulated that accredited representatives from New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania had the right to inspect New York City's water works, meters, and other 
apparatus and records relating to the inflow, outflow and diverted flow of the river. New York 
was also required to build a sewage treatment facility in Port Jewis to prevent hrther future 
pollution, but New York had no money to start this first diversion so deadlines were moved up to 
1940. A large portion of what became the Merriman Dam on Roundout Creek at Lackawack, 
New York in the Catskills, part of the Delaware System of supply, was not built until after World 
War 11.'" 
The Supreme Court ruling in the Delaware River Case ended a very important decade for 
the Delaware River and outlined the rules that would govern the Delaware River for many years 
to come. Water supply emerged as the overriding concern in the basin, and the first water-supply 
dam had been proposed for the Delaware River. The interest in water supply resulted in the 
negotiation of two revolutionary interstate compacts. While neither of these compacts was 
adopted, they ultimately resulted in an expensive, two-year water fight waged before the United 
States Supreme Court. "The rules for playing the water game in the Delaware had now been 
established," wrote Albert. l9  
The Army Corps of Engineers, a public engineering, design and construction 
management agency, had been established by the Continental Congress in 1775. It was 
disbanded after the Revolution and reorganized in 1802. Non-military engineering projects of the 
Corps were usually limited to improvements in navigation, canals and roads, but as time went on, 
their responsibilities grew to include the planning and operation of locks and dams, flood control, 
waterway dredging and beach erosion. Recently, environmental regulation and ecosystem 
restoration were added to the list of responsibilities. 
Many reports and articles mistakenly state that the Army Corps of Engineers did not get 
involved in the Tocks Island project until after 1955. According to Albert, the first Corps activity 
in the Delaware River above Trenton was an 1872 study they conducted to examine the costs of 
'"eidner, p. 313 
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removing navigation hazards for lumber rafting between Trenton and Port Jervis. In 1934, the 
Corps submitted the "Delaware River 308 Report," the first comprehensive water-resources plan 
ever developed for the Delaware River Basin. It not only examined navigation, hydroelectric 
power, flood control, and irrigation, but also water supply and water quality. The report primarily 
dealt with potential dams for hydropower and water supply. Of the 32 dam sites the Corps 
examined, Tocks Island showed the most promise. The Corps water supply plan assumed New 
York City would be completing a second diversion to the headwaters of the Delaware by 
1950.The Corps proposed a large reservoir in the Neversink Valley and a Delaware River 
reservoir near Barryville, New York. To establish a similar water supply plan for New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania, Albert said the Corps proposed building a large reservoir at Tocks Island. "A dam 
in the Minisink Valley was considered ideal because the valley was not occupied by railways or 
extensive and highly valuable improvements,"20 The Corps found the development of the 
Delaware River Basin economically feasible and a project that at the time, did not warrant 
federal participation. Instead, they recommended an interstate agency be formed to complete the 
project. There was little opposition or reaction to this study because there was no money for it. 
The country was suffering from the Great Depression and the creation of a similar project by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority was very controversial. 
20 Albert, p. 28 
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Early Army Corps of E~tgineers Incodel Dam plan map shows W@uk Bend as the 
p r i q  dam site. Lder the site war chmged to nearby Tach ~ s l a d '  
In anticipation of the 308 Report, the Electric Power Company of New Jersey was 
incorporated and later applied to the Federal Power Commission for permits to build 
21 Albert, p. 40 
hydroelectric dams at Tocks Island, Belvidere and Chestnut Hill. New York City, Philadelphia 
and other cities opposed the project because they wanted dam sites preserved for water-supply 
uses that would benefit various coal and private power companies and did not want any possible 
competition from New Jersey. 
Following two damaging floods in 1936, the federal government passed the Flood 
Control Act of 1936, expanding the federal government's roIe in flood control and givins this 
responsibility to the Army Corps of Engineers, making it the "nation's largest dam-building 
agency " The three principle states continued to conduct intermittent studies for the next few 
years, but nothing was agreed upon. 
In 1949, the Delaware River Development Corporation was established in New Jersey 
and by 195 1 the company received a Federal Power Commission Preliminary Permit to study 
three suggested Delaware River power dam sites, the largest to be at Tocks Island. The proposal 
to build dams across the Delaware River governed by an interstate compact continued. A new 
group of proponents, assisted by another interstate water fight and a devastating flood, stepped 
forward to promote the Belvidere and Chestnut Hill dam sites while Tocks Island lurked in the 
shadows.22 Pennsylvania meanwhile continued to consider Walpack Bend as a possible dam site. 
On May 25, 1955, the Department of Forests and Waters hired the engineering firm of Albright 
and Friel, Inc. to review the design of the Walpack Bend dam proposal and provide 1955 cost 
estimates. It was clear by 1955 that plans were being made to dam the main stem of the 
Delaware River. 
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The Great Flood of 1955: A Turning Point for Delaware Dam Management 
In August, 1955 hurricanes Connie and Diane dumped nearly 20 inches of rain causing 
the Delaware River to rage and flood. These two simultaneous tropical storms caused the Great 
Delaware River Flood of 1955, which claimed the lives of more than 200 people and destroyed 
or heavily damaged several thousand homes and businesses. A thirty foot high wall of water 
crashed onto a cIubkouse at Camp Davis killing thirty-seven young campers and their 
counselors. Military helicopters airlifted hundreds of more fortunate children from other flooded 
campsites along the Delaware. Water surges left some towns along the river under nearly ten feet 
of water, while four bridges between the Delaware Water Gap and Trenton collapsed, including 
the Columbia Portland Bridge that eventually slammed into and destroyed the Northampton Free 
Brid~e that spanned between Phillipsburg and Easton, Pennsylvania. This tragedy in the east, 
where floods were uncommon, received tremendous media attention. As President Eisenhower 
arrived, the New York and Philadelphia media raced to the scene to report on the region's worst 
natural disaster, with $500 million in property losses in thirteen states. 
For many years people incorrectly credited the Great Delaware River Flood of 1955 as 
the sole motive for building the Tocks Island Dam. According to Albert, plans for a dam were 
already under consideration prior to the flood, which drew considerable attention and support for 
dam legislation. "The long-standing efforts of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and New Jersey were 
being pursued vigorously even as the first raindrops After the Flood of 1955 there was a 
great push to dam the Delaware River and the Army Corps of Engineers were welcomed with 
open arms to help get it accomplished. Prior to the flood, federal involvement had been minimal. 
The 308 Report of 1934 and subsequent reviews could never find any justification for federal 
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dams above Trenton. Within a week after the flood, however, Representative Francis Walter of 
Easton called on the governors of Pennsylvania and New Jersey to urge approval of flood-control 
dams on the Delaware River. Before the flood debris was cleared, officials had Albright and 
Friel's engineering report on their desks. The $70 million dam outlined in the report provided 
flood control, recreation, power, and water supply benefits. Located behind the dam, which was 
still supposed to be located at Walpack Bend, was a proposed 25 mile-long lake and profitable 
power facilities. "Coming right after the most devastating flood in Delaware River history, it 
looked particularly good," wrote Albert. He said politicians jumped on the dam bandwagon and 
with a flurry of resolutions, ordered reviews of old studies and new ones. There were public 
hearings on the extent of the flood damages and opinions were solicited on a possible dam 
project. "At all the hearings, local and state interests were unanimous in their desire for the 
federal government to take a lead role in the water affairs of the Delaware River Basin," wrote 
~ 1 b e 1 - t . ~ ~    he most comprehensive study of the Delaware River Basin had begun with reports and 
studies being done by numerous agencies and government departments. There was little doubt 
from the beginning that the survey would recommend one or more dams for the Delaware River. 
In February, 1957 the Corps concluded that a dam could be built at Tocks Island if an earth filled 
structure was used. This reservoir at Tocks Island could hold twice as much water as a reservoir 
built with a dam at the alternative site of Walpack Bend because Tocks was eight miles fbrther 
downstream and the reservoir could flood the Flat Brook section of New Jersey. It was viewed as 
a tremendous cost savings and killed the Walpack Bend plan. 
On March 25, 1957 the Ford Foundation awarded a $1 3 1,000 grant for a study of 
potential administrative organizations for interstate river basins. The grant for the study went to 
Syracuse University. They recommended a water resource agency be established by compact 
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with the federal government as a partner. This agency was to have broad powers within the 
framework of existing federal, state, and local agencies to provide overall planning, coordination 
and supervision. This powefil interstate agency, the Delaware River Basin Commission, 
(DRBC) was con~posed of five commissioners, who were the governors of New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania and Delaware and the United States Secretary of the Interior. It still exists 
today 
In 1960, the Corps completed the "Comprehensive Survey of the Wnter Reso?rrce.s ofthe 
Delaware Basin." This eleven volume study, which became House Document 522, served for 
years as the basis of evaluation for the Tocks lsland Dam project. The compact bill for the 
Delaware River Basin passed the legislatures of all four states involved. President Kennedy 
appointed his Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, to be the chief decision-maker on the 
compact. Lobbying for the legislation was strong and on June 29, the House passed the measure. 
Udall announced that the Kennedy administration favored the compact and on September 16, 
1961, the Senate passed the compact legislation unanimously. President Kennedy signed the bill 
into law on September 27 and thirty days later, the Delaware River Basin Compact was law. On 
January 1, 1962, Congress formalized the Delaware River Basin Commission and on October 23, 
1962, Congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1962, which Albert said contained nearly two 
hundred public-works projects nationwide and the "queen of its projects was the Tocks Island 
Dam." 
"By the end of 1962, proponents of a Delaware River dam had every reason to 
rejoice," said Albert. "All the elements needed to build Tocks Island Dam had 
been accomplished: federal authorization, the creation of the long-sought 
interstate agency, and the creation of general public support for the pro-ject. None 
of these had been accidents. The creation of the Tocks Island Dam project had 
been a well-orchestrated endeavor. After this accomplishment, building a dam 
would seem easy."25 
25 Albert, p. 67 
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CHAPTER 11 
President Johnson: The Environment, Vietnam and the Economy 
What conclusions can be drawn about the history and state of the modern environmental 
movement by the end of the Johnson administration and what did Johnson or Kennedy do, if 
anything, to promote the growth of the movement during this time period when projects like the 
Tocks Island Dam were being routinely built? Was LBJ a conservationist or an environmental 
president and how did this proposed dam and national recreational park fit into his national 
domestic policy, especially his Great Society programs and was it affected by the War in 
Vietnam? Had the environmental movement grown so strong and powefil nationally that it 
reached the White House and influenced the Johnson Administration not to build Tocks Island, 
or was it just a question of economics~ Just how much did Johnson personally adopt a modern 
environmental philosophy rather than remedial conse~ationism has been a subject examined by 
historians who have been scrutinizing the more recently released documents of Johnson's 
presidential papers during the past two decades 
When the Tocks project was first authorized, it seemed to have widespread appeal The 
only significant opposition came from the local residents who were to be displaced Some 600 of 
them filed a class action suit against the project in 1965, but the case was ironically dismissed on 
the grounds that the government had not consented to be sued. The Army Corps began buying 
property and evictins residents, but little attention was focused on the dam project itself until 
1968 when two power companies proposed using Sunfish Pond near Tocks Island as the upper 
reservoir for a pumped storage electric generating facility. The property surrounding the pond 
had once been owned by the state of New Jersey, but had been sold to the power companies. The 
destruction ofthis pond, a favorite hiking destination in the Appalachian ridge overlooking the 
Delaware, drew public opposition and resulted in a grassroots campaign to "Save Sunfish Pond." 
This small but successful controversy drew the attention of the media and eventually junior New 
Jersey Assemblyman Thomas Kean who introduced a bill opposing it and urged the state to 
reclaim the property. Although the bill never went anywhere, eventually the DRBC caved into 
local pressure and the facility was built at another site, Yards Creek in Blairstown, New Jersey. 
Irene Travis Thompson, Professor Emeriti of Sociology, wrote: 
Apart from this minor episode, environmental groups seemed favorably disposed 
toward the (Tocks Island) project because they saw it as an alternative to the 
growing commercial development of the area. The dam and associated recreation 
area were perceived as a way to prevent the kind of unpleasant sprawl and 
destruction that have taken place in the nearby Pocono Mountains area." 
The Army Corps began buying small amounts of land in the Minisink area in 1965 and 
continued to do so throughout the late sixties despite hnding cutbacks. Slowly, a controversy 
over the dam project began to develop and by the late 1960s the cast of opposing groups 
included: the Delaware Rver Basin Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers, the National 
Park Service, Congress, (especially the Public Works and Appropriations Committees,) newly 
established state departments of environmental protection, a variety of environmental and public 
interest groups especially the Environmental Defense Fund and the Save the Delaware Coalition, 
power companies, water supply companies, members of the fishing, farming, real estate, hotel 
and tourism industries, highway and construction unions, various Chambers of Commerce, local 
residents, and a large number of state and local officials. Some believed there was a lot of money 
to be made and sides had been drawn. As studies of the costs and benefits of the dam 
proliferated, environmental concerns seemed to serve as the dominant force behind the groups 
opposed to the dam, while dam proponents stressed the values of efficiency, growth, and 
26 Irene Travis-Thomson, "The Tocks Island Dam Controversy," in When Values Conflict, Essays on Environmental 
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economics. This impasse caused the Tocks project to take on public significance at the end of the 
decade.27 In 1973, Michael Frome, wrote what became the environmentalists' manifesto for the 
Save the Delaware Coalition entitled: The Tocks IslandDam: n Prelimir~ary Review. Frome 
wrote: 
Concerned citizens all over the country are watching Tocks Island. . . .This is an 
issue of national magnitude, in which the little people who care will have their 
day. It marks the dawning of a new day, when the long-range effects on the 
environment must be measured, understood and evaluated before the shovel is 
turned, not after.28 
Travis-Thompson called Tocks Island a turtling paint in environmental decision making 
"Implicitly it is also a defense against the image of environmentalists as a small elitist group who 
care more about rivers and fish and trees than about the exigencies and realities of human ~ife ."~" 
In 1970, Congress ordered construction of the dam to begin as soon as approval was 
granted by the Council on Environmental Quality. The Corps issued its legislatively required 
Environmental Impact Statement in 1971, but the brief statement was met with criticism by the 
Council, which demanded revisions and further studies. After that, opposition gained momentum 
as politicians and the public turned against the project. Some believe the argument had turned 
around in a new environmentally friendly and conscious political climate. Others wanted to stop 
the creation of a huge national park with a man-made lake and recreational facilities expected to 
draw crowds of ten million annually from the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. 
Surrounding small rural town residents had a xenophobic fear of being over-run by "city people." 
The mayor of one town in Warren County told a newspaper reporter that everyone would have to 
buy new locks for their doors to protect themselves from the hordes of the unwashed. Especially 
in New Jersey there was concern for the areas surrounding the proposed park and the costs of 
27 Travis-Thompson, p. 36 
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providing expanded infrastructure such as highways, hospitals, police and fire protection and the 
growth of service related businesses such as hotels, restaurants, gas stations and convenience 
stores. Travis-Thompson wrote: 
Far from protecting the area against unwanted growth, the dam came to be seen as 
encouraging industrial and residential development by providing more water and 
power and bringing in tourist and commercial development along with the 
recreation fa~ility.~' 
A small number of environmental opponents were concerned about traffic, congestion, 
waste disposal, seasonal drawdown, eutrophication and damage to fisheries, the yearly shad 
spawns and the oyster beds of the Delaware Bay. Destruction of the last sizable free-flowing 
river in the east, the displacement of local communities and destruction of a picturesque and 
historic valley became significant reasons for some people like former New Jersey Governor 
William Cahill to openly oppose the dam in 1972, even though credit for stopping the project is 
publicly credited to Governor Brendan Byrne, who voted as a member of the Delaware River 
Basin Commission to recommend Congress de-authorize the project. Some authors and 
scientists, who today consider themselves environmentalists, believe the end of the dam pro-iect 
was a victory for the environmental movement. Princeton Professor, Dr. Robert Socolow agreed. 
"It was only the beginning of the environmental movement, but people came to 
understand how they had been vastly underestimating what a valuable 
environmental resource the area truly is," said SocoIow. "By then, we had landed 
on the moon and saw the earth from the outside. Ecologists, biologists, scientists 
began asking questions We came to realize this dam wasn't the big gift we had 
been led to think it was "71 
President Kennedy's New Frontier and Johnson's Great Society were ambitious programs 
that both depended heavily on economic growth. Following the stagnation of the Depression in 
the 1930s, World War I1 ignited the economy and helped create an unprecedented period of 
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affluence that lasted for the next two decades. Population growth, suburbanization and the 
emergence of the Sunbelt provided additional tax resources for national security and public 
services. The Kennedy-Johnson tax cut signed into law in 1964 greatly expanded economic 
demand and expansion and heled the vision for Johnson's Great Society domestic programs. 
Johnson's patriotism, political acumen, and social activism, as well as his economic 
inexperience, notorious obstinance, personal abusiveness and egotism all seemed to know no 
boundaries. "Hell, we're the richest country in the world, the most powefil. We can do it all," 
said LBJ. "We can do it if we believe it."32 Johnson believed the United States was the world's 
military defender of democracy. By the time Kennedy was assassinated, there were 16,000 
military personnel in Vietnam and the United States helped overthrow the repressive South 
Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Fearful of both Eisenhower and Kennedy critics, 
Johnson was determined to continue fighting communism and staythe-course in Vietnam, a 
decision that would later prove to be fatal to his presidency. 
Domestically, Johnson was in a race to push through an enormous amount of liberal 
legislation aimed at improving the quality of American life and remediating the polluting effects 
of post World War I1 industrial growth. Environmental historian Samuel P. Hays said this period 
included a shift from concern about creating outdoor recreation and preserving wildlands and 
open space to more of a focus on preserving nature and ecological balance and stopping man's 
encroachment on nature. People in government had begun adapting environmental sensibilities 
and langwage. Modern environmentalism was slowly surfacing. Hays said traditionally, 
conservationists justified the utilization of all natural resources if they were used efficiently and 
economically, as opposed to preservationists, who wanted to save or preserve them Within the 
framework of centralized federal bureaucracy, post-industrial law and policy makers had focused 
32 Richard N. Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (New York: Harper Collins, 1995) p. 258 
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on utilization, sound conservation practices and of course, making money from manipulating 
natural resources. Naturally, there had been feuds over the control of valuable resources among 
those who wanted to exploit them for commercial purposes, both privately and publicly. 31 
Following the Great Depression, several land and river resource development projects had been 
created during FDR's New Deal, including the famous Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a 
multipurpose river flood- control and hydro-electric project that created jobs and resulted in 
significant regional growth and development. 
The modern environmental movement in the United States had its roots in the 1960s with 
a more public focus on preservation, balanced naturalism, anti-pollution and public health, 
outdoor recreation and the development ofthe ecological sciences. The concept of 
"environmental protection" is often linked to the idealistic sixties generation and was frequently 
and negatively associated with the anti-war, civil rights and anti-poverty movements. As it 
evolved and gained popularity, the environmental movement cut across various political and 
demographic boundaries. Uncontrolled economic growth and wasted resources began to outrage 
avid environmentalists, who had formed national advocacy groups such as the Environmental 
Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council by 1970 The National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 signified the first active political participation in the shift from conservation 
to environmentalism, but Lyndon Johnson's presidency had ended during the middle of this 
transition period and so did the hnding for Tocks Island Dam. 
Both Kennedy's and Johnson's concerns for the environment were rhetoricai and reactive 
Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, who served both presidents, said Kennedy knew the issues and 
33 Samuel P. Hays lnterview, Environmental History 12.3 (2007): 
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recognized their importance, but never raised any issues of environmental concern himself.34 
Udall said Johnson incorporated a great deal more environmental philosophy into his Great 
Society legislation, including nearly three hundred conservation measures, but many of these 
issues were included in  Great Society legislative programs because they were holdovers from the 
Kennedy administration or because Johnson had ordered his special assistant for domestic 
affairs, Joseph Califano, to gather and prioritize the most urgent social needs facing the nation 
and had the young lawyer create a "shopping list" of Great Society issues and programs that 
warranted intervention by the federal government. 
Declassified primary source documents in the LBJ Presidential Library, part of the 
"American Presidency Project," prompted historian Robert A. Divine to edit a compilation of 
articles that were a revisionary examination of the Johnson presidency. In this volume, 
environmental and public policy historian, Martin Melosi, asked an important question: Was 
Johnson's new conservationism really new?35 While Johnson's idealism was mostly tempered by 
political pragmatism and numerous historians and biographers have concluded he had no true 
personal commitment to the growing environmental movement, Hays said he believes the 
Johnson administration should be viewed as a transitional period in the evolution from old-style 
conservationism to modern environmenta~ism.~~ In his conclusions about the Johnson 
administration's conservation achievements, Udall said he tried to alert Johnson that trends 
towards total environmental awareness and quality of life were becoming the central focus of 
"new conservation. " 
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"Well, he was always receptive," said Udall. "Rasically his instincts were very 
good, as I say the instincts of a rural person who has a feeling for the land and 
who came up through the New Deal (when Roosevelt with the country flat on its 
back, said,) "Well let's start rebuilding," and you started with the land, building 
dams and soil erosion, replanting forests. It was a great 
Melosi said Johnson took advantage of the growing environmental movement when it 
served his needs, but his usual motives were often insipid and he was distracted by partisan 
considerations and preoccupied by the Vietnam War. He unintentionally let his administration 
develop and propose environmental policies and legislation and relegated national 
"beautification" programs to his genuinely capable wife, First Lady Bird Johnson that included 
removing billboards and junkyards from highways, anti-littering campaigns and the creation of 
new national parks. There are several famous White House photos of the First Lady being guided 
down the Colorado River or through the Redwoods accompanied by Udall. "By happy 
coincidence, rising grass-roots interest in quality of life issues tapped the spirit of the Great 
Society that President Johnson envisioned," wrote ~ e l o s i . ' ~  However, even aRer the Department 
of Environmental Protection had been established later during President Nixon's administration, 
environmental programs remained diffised and policy fragmented. There was only minimal 
federal environmental protection before 'Nixon with little environmental concern being raised by 
lawmakers about Congressional dam building projects like Tocks Island. 
Udall wrote that he personally had an "environmental epiphany" and began to refocus his 
orientation after reading Rachel Carson's ground breaking environmental book, Silent Spriq ,  on 
the harmful long-term effects of the pesticide DDT. Like thousands of others who read it at the 
time, this book caused Udall to realize how vulnerable and fragile the earth's ecosystems were 
and how we were carelessly destroying them. Udall slowly began to reshape his department's 
37 Stewart L. Udall Oral History Interview 1,5/19/1969, by Joe 0. Frantz, Transcript, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, p. 22. 
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goals and was full of new ideas and promoted new legislation to expand his department. During 
u 
his tenure he managed to help pass landmark legislation to protect the natural "beauty" of the 
land and curb pollution. "In fact, the only brake he ever felt was in the latter years of the Johnson 
administration when the war in Vietnam squeezed his budget, a victim of guns over butter," 
wrote   ern stein.^' The Great Society laws passed attributed to the Johnson's administration 
included: the Clear Air Act; the Wilderness Act of 1964; Water Quality and Clean Water 
Restoration Acts and Amendments; the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act; the 1965 Motor Vehicle 
Air Pollution Control Act; the 1968 Aircraft Noise Abatement Act; the 1968 Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act and the 1968 National Trail System Act. These laws provided the rationale for later 
creating the Environmental Protection Agency and the controversial Superfund that imposed 
government financial penalties on polluters. However, Bernstein pointed out that during the latter 
part of the decade, funding became a major problem because land prices, pushed up by the 
inflation of the Vietnam War, were appreciating at a rate of ten percent a year. According to 
Bernstein, by January, 1967 Udall informed the Bureau of the Budget that the shortfall for the 
next decade could be $2.5 billion. Melosi further quoted Bernstein: 
The overarching goal of the administration-if there was one--was to wed 
concern over the environment to the larger goals of the (3-eat Society. This meant 
identifying with continuing congressional efforts at environmental reform or 
writing new legislation. These programs also fit the spirit of the Great Society and 
firmly grounded the "New Conservation" in traditional conservation causes. 40 
Udall said however that the Vietnam War and countless domestic programs such as Social 
Security and civil rights consumed Johnson's time and his presidency. They rarely spoke. 
"The very name "New Conservation" suggests a looking backward as well as a 
looking ahead,'' wrote Melosi. "While environmental activity was vigorous, some 
programs were merely extensions of Progressive Era or New Deal resource 
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management; others were focused more clearly on anti-pollution and other quality 
of life issues. In some cases the administration was a leader, in some a follower, in 
others a usurper. Despite Udall's claim, the New Conservation was not a coherent, 
consistent 
Johnson's national economic woes had a tremendous impact on funding for projects such as the 
Tocks Island Dam that had prohibitive cash flow problems to begin with. Cost estimates 
continued to rise and topped out at more than $415 million when the project was finally de- 
authorized by Congress. Udall recalled working within the Johnson administration 
"He (LBJ) was very good (prior to 1966) particularly before the budget crunch 
got on. He wanted new programs," said Udall. "He wanted to be innovative. His 
ideal was Franklin D. Roosevelt. He thought about the land a lot the way 
Roosevelt did. Roosevelt was his idol and you could come up with a good idea 
and (tell Johnson)"This is good for the land and good for the people," and he 
bought it."42 
On February 8th, 1965, LBJ conveyed a special messase on conservation and the 
restoration of natural beauty, which exemplified his transitional "new conservationist" outlook, 
to Congress. He proposed the establishment of twelve new national parks, including a park 
surrounding the Tocks Island Reservoir, which would be created by damming the Delaware 
River. At the same time Johnson announced he would soon be sending Congress a bill to 
establish a national wild rivers system, "to identify and preserve free-flowing stretches of our 
great scenic rivers before growth and development make the beauty of the unspoiled waterway a 
memory," the President announced. "The full hnding of the Land and Water Conservation Fund 
will be an important step in making this a Parks for America de~ade."~%e proposed using this 
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fund to the acquire land needed to establish the Tocks Island National Recreation Area. So, at the 
same time he proposed establishing national parks to preserve natural resources and a measure to 
protect America's rivers, he was going to accomplish these innovations by building a dam on one 
of the few remaining free-flowing rivers in the United States and creating a hnd that would be 
used to displace thousands of home and landowners who were in the way. The dutihl Army 
Corps of Engineers were given their marching orders. For several years this proposal received 
sustaining support from a myriad of local representatives who believed their constituents might 
somehow benefit from such a grandiose feat of modern engineering. In the same speech, LBJ 
ironically said he would support the National Trust for Historic Preservation, chartered by 
Congress in 1949, because citizens were rallying to save landmarks of beauty and history. LBJ 
said he intended to propose legislation to authorize grants to help local authorities acquire, 
develop and manage private historical properties and he called the Registry of National Historic 
Landmarks, which received no federal hnding at all, "a fine program." One would have to 
conclude that the historic landmarks and natural landscape of the Minisink Valley doomed to 
become the bed of Tocks Lake did not fit into this cost-conscientious equation. 
LBJ's Choice: Guns or Butter 
and the Economic lmpact on Tocks Island Dam 
Late in his life and well after he became a celebrated author and self-proclaimed 
environmentalist, Stewart Udall wrote that damming the Delaware River "took on national 
significance by becoming a struggle that dramatized the evolution of the environmental 
movement in this c o ~ n t r ~ . " ~ ~  For Udall to have placed such historic significance on the proposed 
dam and the key role he played in the creation of both the dam and surrounding national park is 
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surprising given the fact that there are only a handful of documents pertaining to these projects in 
Udall's personal papers housed at the University of Arizona. However, his statement helps to 
better understand the main argument of this thesis--that construction of Tocks Island Dam was 
not stopped simply because of growing concern for the environment or because growth of the 
environmental movement itself empowered national leaders to adopt anti-dam or protective 
policies for natural resources such as rivers. It was a complicated struggle that evolved over a 
long period of time and was absorbed by the growing environmental movement later in the 
1970s and 80s, but to better understand it's creation and collapse, it is necessary to place it 
historically within the relevant political and economic framework of the Johnson presidency and 
ask why this project was so important to so many people? How did American involvement in the 
War in Vietnam, Johnson's domestic Great Society programs and the economy af'fect the demise 
of Tocks Island dam? 
In the introduction of The .Johnson Years, Volume Two: Yietmm, the Environment, and 
Science, editor Robert Divine examined historian Larry Berman's revealing assessment of 
Johnson's Vietnam policy, his fatehl 1965 decision to h l l y  involve the United States in ground 
fighting in South Vietnam and the flawed advisory process Johnson used to reach that decision. 
Many historians had previously claimed LBJ waMed about Vietnam and was essentially talked 
into involving the United States in full-fledged was. "Berman believes that LBJ never had any 
intention of pulling out of Vietnam," and this advisory process was just a faqade to legitimize the 
prearranged decision to escalate. There was "no fair weighing of the alternatives," wrote Divine. 
Berman agreed and called Johnson a "master of consensus" engaged in a "delicate exercise of 
political juggling."45 The advisory process was used "to legitimize a previously selected option 
45 Divine, p. 13 
by creating the illusion that other views were being  ons side red."^^ Many historians and 
biographers agree the tragic and fatal misjudgment of Americanizing the Vietnam War was due 
to LBJ's dedication to his Great Society legislation and programs, which marginally included 
Tocks Island Dam. By the time the United States was fully engaged in the war, Congress had 
already passed 36 major pieces of Great Society legislation, but another twenty-six, including the 
immensely important Medicare and civil rights bills were still waiting. Divine said LBJ was both 
reluctant to withdraw from Vietnam and unwilling to sacrifice his domestic reforms. Berman 
concluded: 
The result was inevitable: the Great Society would crumble and he would lose in 
Vietnam. Johnson was the cause of his ultimate undoing; the master manipulator 
had finally undertaken a political juggling act that was beyond even his great 
ski11.~' 
There are a number of critical examinations of LBJ that provide important insight into his 
personal character and political motivations. Some historians, like Berman and David 
Halberstam depicted LBJ to be an ambitious and immoral master of manipulation and deception, 
concerned with securing his place in history by emulating his idol President Franklin Roosevelt. 
Believing his Great Society programs to be an extension of the New Deal and motivated by his 
insecure fear of criticism and his distrust of former Kennedy staffers, his need to implement 
andlor outdo Kennedy policies and his well-known bitter relationship with Robert Kennedy, 
some historians believe Johnson misjudged the need for American involvement in the war and 
relied too heavily hawkish advisors. On the other hand, former deputy national security advisor 
to LBJ, Francis Bator called Johnson a "formidable bargainer." Bator said LBJ's Vietnam policy 
revolved around his domestic programs and legislation based on proposals from fourteen task 
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forces the president had commissioned on education, the environment, poverty and the cities, 
"the entire Great Society agenda-was sitting on his desk and the cities were about to burn.'?48 
While trying to juggle it all, including Civil Rights marches and riots, Bator said Johnson lost 
credibility because he chose to partially disguise the Americanization of the war. He avoided 
Senator Jacob Javits invitation to debate the war in the Senate. Historians Bator, Berrnan and 
Halberstam agree Johnson sought to avoid a grand debate on Vietnam because he feared that it 
would embolden political elements that would derail his legislative programs. Instead he 
internalized and expanded the powers of the executive branch and did not ask for a declaration of 
war. The Vietnam War deprived LBJ's domestic programs of money. Bator wrote there was 
nothing that LBJ cared more about in July 1945 than completing and extending the old Roosevelt 
New Deal programs that had stalled in 1938. Bator wrote: 
He knew that an honest discussion of the (war) would provoke a coalition of 
budget balancers and small-government Republicans, who balked at the high cost 
of guns and butter, and Deep South senators, who were determined to block civil 
rights legislation. And so, to avoid a Vietnam versus Great Society debate that 
might destroy his social and civil rights legislation, Johnson sidled into war with 
minimum hss, no prime time speech, no new resolution, no call-up of reserves, 
no tax increase, no drumming up of support. No change in policy.49 
To protect his dreams of social reform, Johnson paid the enormous price of marching into a war 
he knew could not be won. He flatly turned down his Treasury Secretary's repeated 
recommendations during 1966 and 1967 that he prevail on the House Ways and Means 
Committee to pass the tax bill by calling it a "war tax"'" 
Economic historian, Donald F. Kettl wrote that American involvement in Vietnam grew 
rapidly after June 1965 and so did the cost of the war. He said Johnson however waited two 
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years before submitting a plan to increase taxes to pay for it, and then waited another year to 
implement the plan-stalling almost to the end of his presidency. Johnson assured Congress that 
the United States could afford both guns and butter 
Time may require further sacrifices," Johnson acknowledged in his 1966 State of 
the Union message, "and if it does, then we will make them. But we will not heed 
those who would wring it from the hopes of the unfortunate here in a land of 
plenty. I believe we can continue the Great Society while we fight in ~ i e t n a m . ~ '  
It was a juggling act and Johnson simply did not have the revenue to pay for it all, including 
expensive dam projects or other marginal social improvements he had slated as part of his Great 
Society program. 
Kettl recalled the 1972 Atlantic Monthly article by David Halberstam, "How the 
Economy Went Haywire" and noted that Presidential advisor Bill Moyers called the delay in 
seeking the tax increase, "the single most devastating decision in the Johnson administration" 
that helped to undercut the base of his internal support, "a time when he lost control of the 
administration, lost control of events," said Moyers. The three year delay in establishing a tax 
increase to help pay for the war fieled economic growth and unprecedented inflation. "The 
struggle over the tax surcharge was the keystone of Lyndon Johnson's trazedy," wrote ~ e t t 1 . ~ ~  
Historians have long agreed Johnson believed that any tax increase would endanger his social 
programs, prompting an anticipated conservative backlash against the Great Society. Johnson 
was eager to minimize the fiscal burden of the war and protect the Great Society from 
congressional antagonists. Several historians claim Johnson deliberately withheld cost estimates 
of the war for a year to weaken the case for a tax increase. Kettl observed: 
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Halberstam delivered a tough indictment: Johnson had lied to Congress, the 
American public, and his own staff about the real costs of Vietnam. Johnson 
sought, instead, guns and butter-heavy Vietnam spending, coupled with an 
expansive Great Society. It was a living lie, which in the end created economic 
chaos.s3 
Julian E. Zelizer, a public affairs historian and economist, wrote that Congressman 
Wilbur Mills, the powerfill Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee and fiscal 
conservative, believed the Revenue Act of 1964 which cut taxes would stimulate economic 
growth and create full  employment. Zelizer said Mills believed in reducing taxation instead of 
increasing public spending to spur growth. Instead, the government continued to boost 
consumption by spending billions on military operations, weapons manufacturing and military 
bases. In 1965, while members of the Council of Economic Advisors pressed for tax increases, 
Johnson was getting bad advice from Mills not to include the costs for the Vietnam War in the 
budget and instead request a suppIementa1 appropriation to pay for it. Johnson feared the Great 
Society would become a partisan target for those opposed to his expanded social programs. Kettl 
said Johnson delayed any decision on a tax increase in 1965 then deliberately stalled from 1966 
to 1968 as inflation replaced economic growth as the key issue at the top of the national political 
agenda. The fiscal 1967 budget, announced in January 1966, underestimated defense 
expenditures by sixteen percent, which had grown fiom $6 billion to $20.6 billion in just one 
year. According to Kettl, this and subsequent defense budget under-estimates led to a 
duplicitous image of Johnson. Inflation continued to mushroom and a minor tax increase at the 
beginning of 1966 did little to stop the "hemorrhage of military ~ ~ e n d i n ~ . " ~ ~ o n g r e s s  had to 
appropriate more and more supplemental finds for Vietnam, $13.8 billion in the spring of 1966 
and a huge $58 billion defense appropriation for fiscal year 1967. Kelt1 said Johnson asain 
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rehsed to agree to a tax increase and ordered his staff to stop issuing any public statements about 
the state of the economy and the need for tax revenue.55 Halberstam said less than a handful in 
Congress supported a possible tax increase anyway because Johnson consciously chose not to 
disclose the real cost of the war. "It was an extraordinary bit of manipulation, the single most 
irresponsible act by an American President," wrote ~alberstam.'"nstead, Federal Reserve 
Chairman William McChesney Martin predicted he could curb inflation through tighter 
monetary policies and higher interest rates, a weakening of the savings-and loan industry, the 
municipal bond market and housing construction. Johnson unfortunately believed him. 
In the fall of 1966 when Johnson's advisors began working on the next fiscal year 
budget, they finally asreed there was a need for a tax increase. They called for immediate action 
to reduce spending and to impose whatever tax measures necessary to pay for Vietnam. Johnson 
reluctantly agreed with them and sent a special economic message to Congress announcing he 
was imposing immediate spending cuts of $1.5 billion. At this point, things were not too bad. 
The deficit for fiscal 1966 was less than $4 billion, but very soon the economy was out of 
control. Budget deficits had grown to unprecedented levels and there were early signs of serious 
balance of payments problems with foreign countries. Thorndike said Mills did not like the tax 
surcharge and did not think it would pass Congress. He would only agree to any tax increase as 
long as Johnson cut discretionary spending. In a July 19, 1967 memo, Califano fortuitously 
warned the President that Mills was going to be a problem. The constitution requires all tax 
nleasures originate in the House and House procedures required tax bills to originate in the Ways 
and Means Committee. Mills effectively refksed to report the bill out of committee. Mills first 
insisted Johnson cut $4 billion in expenditures and kept increasing that amount until after 
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Johnson announced he would not seek re-election, when a new phase of negotiations with Mills 
resulted in his demand for $5 billion in immediate cuts and $20 billion in cuts to fiture 
appropriations "His position was Johnson would have to choose between guns and butter," 
urote Ketti. "Mills would move toward restraint, but he preferred cutting the Great Society 
programs to increasing taxes."j7 KettI added that Budget Bureau studies showed the 
administration could cut no more than $4 billion without deeply hurting the Great Society 
Califano urged Johnson to fight Mills and Senate leaders circumvented Ways and Means by 
attaching the surcharge to an innocuous Senate bill that Jolinson signed into law. It included 
compromises that required $6 billion in immediate spending cuts and a fbture cut of $8 billion in 
appropriations. This actually favored Mills in current spending cuts, but enabled the 
administration to salvage $1 1 billion less in hture cuts than Mills had wanted, however these 
cuts were unprecedented. "Congress for the first time in history, set a ceiling on federal 
spending," according to Kettl. "Congress told the president how much to cut-but not  here."^" 
Years later, a reflective Johnson said he would not have changed his decision to 
recommend guns and butter budgets to Congress, decisions Kettl wrote, "Were far more 
complicated than the argument that Johnson lied to protect both Vietnam and the Gseat 
Society "j7 white House economists underestimated the degree to which Vietnam was fueling 
the economy in late 1965 and they overestimated the slowdown that occurred in late 1966 and 
early 1967. The federal deficit grew rapidly from $3.8 billion in fiscal 1966 to $8.7 billion in 
1967 and $25.2 billion 1968. Growth in spending for Vietnam greatly added to the deficit, but 
increases in Great Society programs and the slowdown in the economy significantly caused it to 
increase as well. 
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Johnson's national economic woes had a tremendous impact on fwnding for projects such 
as the Tocks Island Darn that had prohibitive cash flow problems to begin with. According to 
Albert, the dam was in financial trouble almost as soon as it was authorized by Congress in 1962 
when the original cost estimate was only $90 million. Cost estimates continued to rise and 
topped out at more than $4 15 million when the project was initially scrapped in 1975. Albert 
concluded: 
The impact of the Vietnam War on Tocks fbnding was almost immediate. Just as 
the dam was being funded, domestic spending programs were being cut. Inflation, 
heated by the budget deficit began rising. Externally, the project was competing 
for dollars that were being sent to fight Communism in Southeast Asia. During 
the second half of the 1960s there just wasn't enough money in the federal 
treasury to build grand dam projects in the Minisink Valley and also wage war."" 
In 1966 The Army Corps received $1.2 million for Tocks for the fiscal year 1967 when 
construction was supposed to begin; however, rising land acquisition prices caused major delays. 
Udall recalled how difficult it became to find knding for land acquisition for national parks and 
that the War in Vietnam put a major squeeze on his budget. His statement supports the theory 
that a lack of finding stalled the entire Tocks Island Dam project. 
"I would say the one really major disappointment to me was when the Vietnam 
War really began to be felt, "said Udall. "The last three years were essentially 
tightening down; slowing down programs and the expansion that we had 
experienced previously was slowed down. I'd say through 1965 our budgets were 
gr-owing and we were really thriving. Then it became a kind of hold-the-Iine 
operation beginning in '66.7'61 
Udall also had to contend with the Army Corps of Engineers, Congressional dam 
builders. In an interview Udall discussed conflicts between the Department of the Interior and 
the Army Corps of Engineers that continued to be a major problem as the 1960s progressed 
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"The Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation arise out of the great momentum of the dam building 
movement that began in the New Deal Days," said Udall. Presjdent Kennedy was in favor of 
building dams and Johnson inherited many of  his programs including Tocks Island Dam 
Whife many of Johnson's other domestic programs were sacrificed, the question-how a 
marginal program like the Tocks Island Dam and National Recreation Area managed to  escape 
the chopping block completely-remains unanswered. One possible answer is given by historical 
biographers who agree Johnson simply refksed to  let go of anything and while he begrudgingly 
allowed programs and projects to  suffer severe budget cutbacks, he kept them alive hoping he 
would find the funding t o  later resurrect them. Secretary Udall suggested another explanation 
might come from a close examination of who supported building dams like Tocks Island and 
why. Udall concluded: 
Thc Corps of Engineers-with thc authority they had-they were given a very broad 
authority by Congress. Most Congressmen under the old pork barrel system, regarded this 
as a beneficial thing, something good for the country and they'd go home with their 
projects and feel that they brought the bacon home for the people . . . but increasingly 
thcsc actlvitm came under question. Conservationists did not want dams in certain arcas. 
So, we began confrontations with thcm. Congress began to put little amendments on bills 
giving lnterior a right to review certain things. Tl~e Corps didn't like any of this. Their 
Congressmen didn't either. . . I found myself as the decade wore on increasingly 
questioning myself some of their major dam building projects that at the beginning of the 
1960s had appeared to be a sort of sacred cow . . . usually, no one was supposed to have a 
say about it evcept the conccmed Congressmen, the people in a given state and the Corps. 
. but it wasn't casy and you had to fight them every step of thc way.b" 
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CHAPTER m 
Is it a Dam, a Lake or a Pork Barrel Park? 
From the time preliminary plans for a dam on the Delaware River were first discussed, 
there were organizations such as municipal utilities and unions, businesses, and private 
individuals who all stood to make a good deal of money. These entities were not only banking on 
the obvious sources of Tocks project revenuewater and hydro-electric power, but recognized 
they could make a great deal of money in real estate brokering, building and construction and 
owning businesses that would support the huge crowds of anticipated park tourists. These 
entrepreneurs became the biggest supporters of Tocks TsIand Dam, not because they supported 
dam building, but because they wanted the enormous man-made lake it would create surrounded 
by one of the biggest national parks in the country. The federal government was providing them 
an open opportunity to make money at tax payers' expense and they mustered all the political 
support they could get. On the other hand, there were some long-time residents, like Nancy 
Shukaitis, who despite knowing they were losing their homes or farms, remained stewards of the 
Minisink Valley and hated to see the area fall prey to such commercial development. This 
chapter will examine the underlying political "pork barrel" support for Tocks Island Dam, a 
project that by all means should have never lingered into the 1970s once finds were cutback. 
Definition of Pork Barrel Legislation: A political term in the post-Civil War 
era. The term comes from the plantation practice of distributing rations of salt 
pork to slaves from wooden barrels. When used to describe a bill, it implies that 
the legislation is loaded with special projects for members of Congress to 
distribute to their constituents back home at the cost of the federal taxpayer.G3 
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Udall ironically told interviewers for the Presidency Project of the LBJ Library that the 
early environmental movement suffered congestive problems at the national level especially 
from lobbyists and powehl legislators from western states, who wanted to protect specific 
industries such as mining and oil. This was ironic because UdalI was just as involved in 
protecting special interests and returning favors to those who had helped him move key 
legislation along. 
The Wilderness Act signed by Johnson in 1964 was considered very controversial and 
was heavily opposed by conservative Colorado Congressman Wayne Aspinall, longtime chair of 
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and an adversary of the budding environmental 
movement. Clearly protecting his constituents' interests, Aspinall fought nearly all legislation 
and programs associated with Udall and the Department of the lnterior and called 
environmentalists "over-indulged zealots" and "aristocrats" to whom "balance means nothing." 
The controversial fight between the federal government and states over public lands in 
the United States is a subject for inquiry and historic analysis by itself, but basically according to 
Udall, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both attempted to encourage the right kinds of 
development at the federal level and expand or limit the role of the federal government where it 
was deemed necessary in particular states. "The attitude you got at the state level to too much a 
degree was based on local pressures, local considerations, and it didn't always accord with the 
best conservation practices and principles," said ~da l l .~%s~ina l l  would not let a bill leave "his" 
committee unless he approved it and this particular fight was over states rights versus expanding 
federal powers over land and the natural resources contained therein by allowing the Department 
of the Interior to classify public lands and evolve management programs that had the potential to 
be friendly or influential to certain industries or private interests. Aspinall either believed 
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individual states should retain these responsibilities or he did not want any new federal 
government agencies interfering or usurping control and backing special interest groups other 
than those already in place. However a closer study shows that in this alleged east versus west 
fight, Udall was just as interested in protecting the special interests of certain politicians 
associated with Tocks Island, who could help him get other national legislation passed and win 
his battles with Aspinall. Udall said he owed political favors. 
Even though a President proposed it (legislation), a congressional committee 
wouldn't even hold hearings for three years. That's the kind of opposition we had. 
The device I used was to work with the (Interior and Insular Affairs) committee 
members who were for it. And particularly Congressman Saylor of Pennsylvania 
became one of the outstanding advocates. He just constantly kept the pressure on 
Aspinall. . .so finally he yielded and he got some concessions on his mining phase 
out. This was a kind of horse trading. I would work with Saylor and others on the 
committee and they'd keep nagging at him.65 
The Wilderness Bill, introduced by Hubert Humphrey in 1957, was violently opposed by 
western politicians such as Aspinall and the debate over public lands dragged on until Johnson 
finally was able to sign the bill in 1964, however as early as 1962, the New York 7i'mes reported 
Udall had endorsed legislation to establish a national recreation area in Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, surrounding the site of the Tocks Island Dam, which had already been authorized by 
Congress. Under a new policy agreement between the Army Corps and the Interior Department's 
Bureau of Reclamation, enough land was to be acquired around reservoir sites to provide for 
public recreation areas. Udall claimed the proposed Delaware national park, with nine major 
recreational sites, would benefit 65 million people. Early attempts at bills authorizing the Tocks 
Recreation area were introduced via committee by Senator Clifford Case, (R-NJ), Rep. Frank 
Thon~pson (D-4th District-NJ) and Harrison Williams, (D-NS) These early attempts died in 
committee, mostly due to Aspinall, but in 1964, coincidentally, the same year the Wilderness Bill 
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became law, legislation was re-endorsed with renewed vigor by New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller and other members of the Delaware River Basin Commission: Governors Richard 
Hughes of New Jersey; William Scranton of Pennsylvania; and Elbert Carve1 of Delaware. 
Rockefeller's public endorsement was announced at the same time he was elected to replace 
Udall as chairman of the DRBC. Cleverly once this battle appeared to be drawn at the state level 
with Udall and the Department of Interior fading into the background, Rockefeller along with 
others who had powefil eastern state-based political interests, including the Kennedys, upstaged 
Aspinall. The new national recreation area, awaiting Congressional approval, would need to add 
another $37 million in land acquisition costs to the $95 million needed to build the dam. With 
necessary funding and political support believed to be in place, Col. E.P. Yates of the Corps of 
Engineers predicted that Tocks Island Dam would be completed as early as 1972, however, as 
discussed previously, finding the war in Vietnam caused budget cutbacks that forestalled this 
process.66 
Roger Kennedy, (no relation to JFK) director of the National Parks in the 1990's said 
Udall pushed to create similar parks on the Jersey Shore and Cape Cod in order to stop 
development, but instead these "parks have become beacons for lucrative tourism." Kennedy 
said Udall used his political acumen and political allies well and understood that "public lands 
like parks enhanced the economic value of privately held land nearby."" 1n 1962 Udall told 
William Blair of the New York Times, that if "you asked the President (Kennedy) to single out 
the five or six most important things, he would name this (Tocks IsIand Dam) as one. Gong-ess 
should not get bogged down in the argument over the need for comprehensive water resources 
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planning," said ~ d a 1 1 . ~ ~  And he was right; the need for creating a water resource was hardly the 
issue at all, just one of many thinly veiled selling points used by those who had much more to 
gain by the creation of this proposed dam and park. 
During his battles with Aspinall and debates over the fbture of public lands Udall had 
formed an alliance with Congressman John Saylor, 22nd District of Pennsylvania, who sat on the 
Interior and Insular Affairs and Veterans Committees and the following subcommittees. 
Territorial and lnsiilar Affairs, Irrigation and Reclamation, Public Lands, Indian Affairs, Mines 
and Mining and National Parks Saylor and Udall had a lot of common interests including Tocks 
Island. Evidence of massive lobbying efforts are contained in Saylor's personal papers on Tocks 
Island Dam and newspaper clips housed at the Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Surprisingly, 
there are very few articles or papers in the libraries of number of prominent politicians who were 
closely associated with Tocks Island, including Louisiana Senator Allen Ellander, Chairman of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee, New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne and Secretary 
Udall. However, the papers of Congressman Saylor contained hundreds of letters of 
correspondence concerning Tocks Island mostly from the Water Resources Association of the 
Delaware River Basin, (WRA-DRB or simply WRA) an organization that claimed to represent 
more than 500 supporters of the dam and the national recreational park, and its off-shoot 
organization the Tocks Island Regional Advisory Council. 
Still in existence today, the WRA was established in 1959 as a non-profit and self- 
proclaimed non-partisan advocacy group to promote "sound water resource nianasement in the 
Delaware River Basin." Back then, the group was composed of mostly private businessmen, 
some water, power and utility companies, sewage companies and government and municipal 
agencies. There were no environmental interests represented in this organization that claimed 
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they helped to establish the Delaware River Basin   om mission.^^ Leaders and members of the 
WRA emphatically endorsed the dam and the park, distributed pricey color pamphlets and 
brochures, made speeches, held conferences and conducted publicity campaigns, issued press 
releases to the media and made a documentary film that called for united lobbying efforts to 
persuade Congress to act on the dam's constr~ction.~~ The WRA, later headed by President 
Frank Dressler, really represented many organizations and people who stood to benefit from the 
Tocks project including the vacation resort industry, unions and other labor groups, builders, 
land speculators, private utilities, economic development organizations and members of various 
Chambers of Commerce and land speculators. 
The WRA had conducted their own impact studies on employment, income levels and the 
tax base for the five counties to be involved in the recreation area and members were fully aware 
of who stood to benefit and kept pushing for enactment of the bill. Dressler offered federal 
authorities assistance in assessing changes in land use, transportation, utilities and other public 
services and how to cope with any other anticipated problems resulting from the Tocks Island 
Recreational Area. Dressler indicated the WRA would volunteer to act as a liaison inter-agency 
committee to keep local governments informed and as an advisory liaison between the Army 
Corps of Engineers and the National Park Service. He even wrote to Aspinall urging him to 
change federal policies regarding federal reimbursement of temporary lost tax ratables to 
counties and municipalities during the land acquisition process. He urgently lobbied Saylor and 
other representatives to have the recreation area created as expeditiously as possible. "Land 
values in the region are rising so sharply that if action is deferred on the authorization bilI until 
69 http://www.wradrb.org/whoiswra.asp 
70 Albert, p. 82 
an impact study is completed and all problems are carefblly considered, there may be no action 
on the recreation bill at all," wrote ~ re s s l e r .~ '  
Another effect the War in Vietnam had on the demise of Tocks Island was giving 
property owners and real estate investors time to speculate on land and escalate the prices of 
property everyone knew the government would need to buy. Land acquisition for the national 
park did not begin until 1967 and there were funding problems almost as soon as it was 
authorized. "The recreation area was affected by cutbacks due to the Vietnam War, but to a 
lesser extent than the dam project. The price for land was the major dollar problem for the 
National Park Service, " wrote ~ l b e r t . ~ ~  The agency had been given only $3 7.5 million to 
purchase 47,675 acres of land and the price kept escalating. The price of real estate, both inside 
and on the outskirts of the site doubled and sometimes tripled as early as 1965, according to local 
news articles. One real estate salesman told the Pocono Record his firm had received hundreds of 
calls and visits from large investors in both New York and Philadelphia. At that time, the Army 
Corps estimated it would need to acquire nearly 50,000 acres of land on both sides of the 
Delaware. "Owners within the dam area are placing high and often unreasonable price tags on 
properties because they think the government will pay. Owners see this as a way out," wrote the 
unidentified salesman. He said speculators were willing to invest large amounts of money for 
land even though the exact boundaries of the recreation area had not yet been determined. 
Another ad in the Wall Sl~.ee/ Jownal offered 625 choice acres on the Delaware River for sale. 
"This offering is particularly attractive because of i t s  involvement in the scheduled establishment 
of a thirty-seven mile lake and the National Park surrounding the lake-already approved by 
Congress." Lewis and Haring Realtors in Newton, 
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New Jersey claimed the property had "built-in value for any negotiations with the government- 
condemnation is scheduled within three to four The Newark Szmdqv News ran ads 
offering summer homes for only $3,495 or lots were offered for $279, requiring a down payment 
of only $1 5 and $5 payments per month at Blue Mountain Lakes, within the boundaries of the 
recreation area. "Persons purchasing land now may expect to earn a profit between their purchase 
price and the fair market value which the Government must pay at the time of acquisition," the 
ad proclaimed. 7" 
One of the largest slated developments was Hidden Lake in Monroe County, PA within 
the park's proposed boundaries and only two miles from Tocks Island itself. This picturesque 390 
acre private vacation community surrounding its own 40 acre lake was being priced beyond any 
possibility of public use and the owners, Western Heritage Properties, Ltd., a Toronto 
corporation, were being protected because the president of WRA at the time, prior to Dressler 
was Charles R. Bensinger, a Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania attorney, who sat on the development 
corporation's board of directors. It had sold twice within one year, doubling in price the second 
time. A neighbor and later ardent leader of the anti-Tocks movement, Nancy Shukaitis, publicly 
accused Bensinger of conflict of interest during her testimony to the House Subcommittee on 
National Parks on June 9, 1964. Apparently the Board of Directors or Western Heritage thought 
it would be advantageous to have a resident of the Poconos region who was thoroughly familiar 
with the area, on their board. Bensinger was already the corporate local counsel and a 
stockholder before elected to the board in 1963. Saylor reacted by saying he would look into the 
matter, while Bensinger quietly resigned. 
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Also in 1964 the WM-DRB produced and distributed a slick and expensive, full-color 
pamphlet entitled Tocks Island and Outdoor Recreatinrl. for ihe Crowded East that urged readers 
to contact members of Congress to support the recreation area. The intended audience was 
special interest groups associated with the vacation-resort industry, labor unions, government 
builders and economic development organizations. In 1965, the National Park Service published 
an identical pamphlet entit led Tocks Z s h d  Nntiotml Recreation Area--A Pro~~osnl, that was paid 
for by the WRA-DRB, who helped distribute 25,000 copies. These pamphlets infuriated local 
residents. Again, activist Shukaitis testified. 
These persons (Delaware Valley homeowners) do not have a public relations 
group or lobbyists to front for them and are no competition for the interests of 
water for basin industry, proponents who want a fast return on their developer 
dollar. This brochure doesn't even mention that anyone lives in the project area. 
In the past few years land speculation has moved so rapidly, so lavishly and with 
such confidence of this bill's passage that it warrants a full-scale investigation. Of 
course it is difficult to uncover straw buyers and fictitious names, but the makeup 
of new corporations would be most revealingS7j 
Ironically, Bensinger himself had also warned the federal government to move quickly on 
the Tocks Island Iand acquisition because the costs of buying land would rise due to real estate 
developers. "The speculators probably have contacts within the government and have inside 
information," said ~ e n s i n ~ e r . ~ '  One such specific government connection was between Dressler, 
Saylor and Udall. In a letter dated Sept. 14, 1966, in which Dressler casually addressed Saylor as 
"Dear John," he asked SayIor to keep Udall to his promise of providing $15 million that year for 
land acquisition. In another of his many letters, Dressler proksely thanked Saylor for everything 
he had done to facilitate the authorization and knding of Tocks Island Dam and the Delaware 
- 
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Water Gap National Recreation Area. "We of course look forward to working with you until the 
day these vitally important projects have been completely developed," wrote Dressler. Saylor 
replied on December 8th, 1966. Saylor warned Dressler that he now had to get bonding bills 
approved for hnding because of federal spending cut backs. 
To be clear, the dam and the national park represented two different and separate 
projects, two separate acts of legislation and two filnding revenue streams with attached budgets 
that each needed congressionally approved appropriations. Tocks Island National Recreation 
Area legislation was introduced in early 1965 by Saylor, who at the time was the ranking 
minority leader of the House Interior Committee. Udall wrote a letter to Aspinall requesting his 
views on this legislation, HR 89, to establish the Tocks Island National Recreation Area, (the 
name was later changed to the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area) and strongly 
recommended enactment. "The Tocks Island Dam will create a sizable reservoir of good quality 
water, the recreational values of which wiI1 be exceptionally high," wrote UdalI. He told Aspinall 
the multi-purpose reservoir, which would account for 14,800 acres of the 71,975 acre park, 
would become one of the most significant areas of water-based recreation in the eastern United 
Pennsylvania Congressman Richard Schweiker supported the national park because 
recreation was his state's number one growth industry with nearly one billion a year in revenues, 
but relative to its potential, it remained his state's most undeveloped industry. There was 
tremendous support for H.R. 89 and President Johnson signed the bill creating the national park 
into law on September 1"' 1965. It gave the Secretary of Interior $37.4 million to acquire an 
additional 47,675 acres of land and $18.2 million for recreational faciIities, which were to 
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include thirty-one separate development sites, 11,000 picnic tables, 6,500 camp sites, 135 boat 
launches, 1,860 boat docks, 33,000 parking spaces, 1 5 food service areas and beaches for 66,000 
people divided into nine beach areas. There were also going to be facilities for camping, boat 
rentals, hiking and biking trails, horseback riding, picnicking, hunting, fishing, sailing, motor 
boating, canoeing, rock climbing, winter sports, nature centers, playgrounds, ball fields, historic 
sites, interpretive facilities and the dam itself. All of this for an expected 1 50,000 people per 
day-making this the busiest park in the United States. Even after LBJ signed the bill, Dressler 
wrote to Udatl urging him to begin the project as rapidly as possible and again, he copied Saylor. 
Udall still had to contend with the Army Corps of Engineers, the congressional dam 
builders. In an interview Udall discussed conflicts between the Department of the Interior and 
the Army Corps that continued to be a major problem as the 60s progressed. "The Corps and the 
Bureau of Reclamation arise out of the great momentum of the dam building movement that 
began in the New Deal ~ a ~ s . " ~ '  Udall said Kennedy was in favor of building dams and Johnson 
inherited many of his programs including Tocks Island Dam. Udall learned about "pork barrel 
legislation" quickly. 
One of many strong proponents of the "guns or butter" theory, historian Irving Bernstein 
agreed Udall himself was an "old school" conservationist, who continued to promote traditional 
programs and expand the national park system and public lands program despite rumblings from 
those who wanted a more aggressive and progressive environmental agenda. Instead, Bernstein 
said Udall's agenda included making the western-oriented Department of Interior more national 
in scope by creating new national parks in the East that would provide outdoor recreation to 
crowded cities and suburbs. In a July 27, 1963 newspaper article in the Getty~b~trg T/mes, Udall 
was quoted as saying he felt "Tocks Island Park was overdue" and called the dam "one of the top 
78 Udall Interview V, p. 10 
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projects of the Delaware River Basin Commission." He predicted ground would be broken 
within the next fifieen months and that the project would be completed prior to 1970. 
Udall was apparently very mindhl of the political "pork barrel" interests involved in 
Tocks Island dam and local constituents who stood to make a good deal of money from this new 
national park located within 100 miles of the nation's greatest population concentration. He 
predicted that the area would be visited by more than six million people annually. Another 
politician who supported the project fi-om its inception (during the Kennedy administration) was 
Senator Harrison Williams (D-NJ) who had a history of supporting pork barrel type legislation 
From this perspective, the Tocks Island Dam and Delaware National Park were hardly 
environmental controversies at all. The real fight (over the federal government building a man- 
made recreational lake with a national park protecting and surrounding it) was between those 
who stood to benefit from the millions of people expected to visit it annually and local residents, 
even those losing their homes, who did not want to see rural New Jersey and Pennsylvania over- 
developed and crowded with park goers. It was a classic case of "not in my backyard," or 
NIMBY. For those who were adamantly against building this project early-on, environmental 
concerns were not that important. 
Also adding to the dam building turmoil during Johnson's administration were several 
attempts to consolidate various depadments especially through the 1 964 Task Force on 
Government Organization, chaired by Donald K. Price, who recommended creating a new 
Department of Natural Resources. Favored by Udall, this would have merged the Departments of 
Interior, Agriculture, Forest Service and Soil Conservation, along with the Army Corps of 
Engineers. Water resource fbnctions were to go to the Federal Power Commission. The Army 
Corps favored keeping the status quo as a way of protecting its monopoly over dozens of public 
works projects. In addition, because there was so much money involved, the Bureau of the 
Budget argued against allowing this new and potentially powerfiil merged department the ability 
to coordinate and plan functions that Congress had assigned to the Water Resources Council 
through the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965. These reorganization attempts went nowhere 
and demonstrated how much inter-agency territorial rivalry existed and the arms-length 
relationship between the Army Corps and the Department of the Interior. The development of 
programs took priority over making comprehensive environmental policy because programs 
could be controlled by agencies, whereas policies could not be. Udall believed a new and 
powerfid environmental department could have been established then had Johnson supported it, 
but "Johnson was too much the politician to be caught up in such a web," wrote Albert. 79 
"The naturalistic park and Tocks Island Dam were pipe dreams," wrote Albert. 
"By all rights a host of dignitaries should have descended on the Minisink in 1967 
and, grasping ribbon-bedecked shovels, turned over the first soil." No ceremony 
ever took place. "Try as they might the Corps of Engineers could not get 
construction started in the turbulent decade of the 1960s."~" 
This directly supports the argument that time and money were the most significant factors 
affecting the demise of the Tocks Island Dam. Had the first shovel of soil been turned in 1967, 
the project might have moved ahead. An examination of LBJ's federal budgets and subsequent 
allocations indicates projects that were already started, continued to receive more hnding than 
those that had not. During this critical window of time, prior to the end of the LBJ presidency, a 
continued reduction of funding due to inflation and spending for the Vietnam War coupled with 
skyrocketing project costs, made Tocks Island Dam a low fbnding priority and continuously 
stalled project . While he worked for a non-profit environmental organization that clearly 
claimed Tocks was stopped by the environmental movement, Albert briefly mentioned the War 
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in Vietnam and a lack of funding several times in his book, but did not develop this aspect 
further. "It was cold, hard cash, or the lack of it rather, that kept dam building from occurring," 
wrote Albert. "Tocks Island Dam had a tremendous cash-flow problem . . . the project was 
competing for dollars that were being sent to fight Communism in Southeast ~ s i a . " "  
During the second half of the 1960's there just wasn't enough money in the federal 
treasury to build grand dam projects and wage war, according to Albert, who said Tocks Island 
Dam was in serious financial trouble even as Congress authorized the project in 1962. Costs 
turned out to be extremely underestimated. Originally the price tag was a little more than $90 
million and increased to $95 million by the time Congress appropriated the first finds because of 
inflation. As planning actually got underway, the cost estimates rose significantly. Changes in 
dam design due to geological problems added an additional $16 million before July, 1965 and 
the need for protective works in the upper part of the reservoir pool added another $14 million. 
Estimates to relocate cemeteries, schools, highways and power lines proved inadequate and 
added another $12 million to the pro-ject, increased cost of land acquisition added another $15 
million and more money to purchase land for wildlife migration measures added $8 million. 
By July, 1967 the estimated cost of Tocks Island Dam was $198 million-a tremendous $100 
million increase in less than three years, which may not seem like much money by today's 
standards, but then it had a very negative impact on Congress. In the House, the Public Works 
Committee ordered a staff study of the project's benefit cost ratio, which was never made public, 
according to Albert, but was leaked to the Pocn~o Record on March 2 1, 1968. The report 
allegedly found the cost benefit ratio had fallen to below the 1.4 or 1.5 the Army Corps 
maintained. No one had previously taken into account $4 million in estimated damages to the 
Delaware Bay's oyster industry. The Army Corps disputed these findings and the project 
lbid 
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survived temporarily until its costs again were questioned by Senator Allen Ellander (D-La.), 
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works and in the House by Public Works 
Chairman, Michael Kinvan @-Ohio) "Even Congress, which usually favored expensive pork- 
barrel projects, was beginning to wonder ifthe country could afford a costly project like Tocks," 
wrote Albert. "Tocks Island Dam was beginning to get a reputation as a bottomless pit for federal 
appropriations." 82 
The results of this public notoriety during a time of serious inflation and budget crisis 
spending during the Vietnam War resulted in two scathing full page editorials in Time Magazine 
that specifically recommended cutting expenditures for unnecessary projects such as Tocks 
Island Dam. The first anonymous editorial was published August 4th, 1967. Entitled "Congress: 
Where Charily Beg~ns" criticized the House for recentIy passing a $4.6 billion public works 
appropriation bill. "$2 billion of which is pork. . .including such frills as the Delaware River- 
Tocks Island reservoir and recreational program at the New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania 
border, which was supposed to cost $90.4 million but has since grown to a tidy little $198 
million affair." 83 The author had obviously studied the 478 page federal budget, which was the 
subject of national debate and confusion. "Practically everyone agrees the federal budget is 
bloated, but practically nobody can agree on just where to cut. The issue will profoundly affect 
elections, prices and everyone's pocketbook in 1968 and beyond," the article stated. The author 
pointed out the ongoing debate about national goals and priorities and which ones the United 
States should find. Congress had already cut appropriations by $4.5 billion and LBJ, under 
pressure fiom Congress, offered a fbrther cut of $2.6 billion by paring 10 % from outlays for 
controllable programs and 2% from personnel costs. Even with these cuts, federal spending was 
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expected to climb to $136 billion while the deficit was close to $20 billion, the highest since the 
World War I1 era. Prices were rising and the dollar was debilitated. 
The second article contained derisive suggestions on how Washington should cut federal 
spending on unnecessary programs such as Tocks Island  am.'^   he author suggested that 
Congress and the president should ask three questions about every major item of expense: Is the 
expense necessary for national security? Would a postponement of the program lead to a much 
greater costs in the future? Will this expense improve the lives of most Americans? The author 
recommended not cutting hnding for education, foreign relations, or poverty progranls, but felt 
cuts should be made to agriculture and defense. "Without slackening the Vietnam War effort 
now costing $30 billion a year, the US can substantially reduce its $74.5 billion defense budget 
by slowing military construction, bringing home troops from Korea and Europe and reducing 
foreign military aid." Other areas where the Time article recommended the government cut 
spending included the space program, seaways, airways and public works. Albert wrote: 
The rich aroma of pork converts even the most ardent budget cutters into big 
spenders. The $4.6 billion public works bill for fiscal 1968 was approved, but 
high on Times recommended hit list for funding cuts was the non-essential and 
increasingly expensive Delaware River-Tocks park.x5 
Rising costs immediately resulted in a slow-down of the project. During hearings in March 1968, 
after Senator Ellender publicly questioned the cost benefit ratio of the dam projected at around 
1.4, the General Accounting Office (GAO) studied the project and determined that recreational 
benefits had been overstated by $8 million, while water supply benefits were understated by $21 
million. This meant that the water supply accounted for more than 30 percent of the total costs 
- - -  
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and the Water Supply Act of 1958 required the Army Corps to have contracts for the sale of 
water in excess of 30 percent prior to construction. Ellender's reaction to this report was to insist 
that the Senate Appropriation Committee report contain criticism of the way Tocks Island 
benefits were being calculated by the Army Corps. In 1969 hnding for the dam was not only cut 
back, but delayed for the first time. Although the GAO did not sound an alarm over the overall 
benefit-cost ratio, concern over the allocation of benefits, coupled with an austere budget that 
provided the Philadelphia District with only about $2 million in fiscal year 1969 for construction 
purposes, meant that by the dawn of the 1970s, the Corps had not yet begun constructio:: of the 
dam. 
CHAPTER IV 
Nix on Tocks: The Environmental Demise of the Dam? The 1970s and Beyond 
As the turbulent decade of the sixties came to a close and President Johnson refixed to 
run for another term, Richard M. Nixon came into ofice leading the populist "silent majority" in 
his fhtile attempt to re-establish domestic tranquility. The War in Vietnam dragged on, the 
economy continued to suffer and no contracts had been forged for the construction of Tocks 
Island Dam. Sixties protesters of every kind formed a natural alliance with ecologists as the 
environment slowly became a national issue. Americans now concerned with preservation not 
conservation, began to attract attention and influence the country's lawmakers. Had Tocks Island 
Dam been fbnded and construction started during the Johnson administration prior to the 
seventies, it might have slipped past new regulatory environmental legislation, the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which required the Army Corps to hrnish an environmental 
impact statement. It might have not have attracted the attention of national environmental groups 
who were joining displaced residents to fight the dam. Again, it was an issue of time created by a 
lack of funding due to the war. Those who strongly felt this impact statement led to the 
"environmental demise" of Tocks Island may not have been aware that the key players, members 
of the Delaware River Basin Commission, who voted against the dam in 1975, did not 
necessarily do so for environmental reasons. It was really an issue of money. 
Sunfish Pond: An Environmental Caveat 
A separate, but related part of the proposed Tocks Island Dam Project was the Kittatinny 
Mountain Project, which called for the construction of a pumped, water-storage system on top of 
a high ridge of the Appalachians that border the Delaware River on the New Jersey side. The 
land, which included the scenic, but sterile forty-acre Sunfish Pond, had been part of the original 
Worthington Estate, sold to Governor Robert Meyner and the State of New Jersey in 1954. It 
remains part of Worthington State Forest. 
In 1956, studies were conducted by Public Service Gas and Electric, Jersey Central 
Power and Light and New Jersey Poser and Light Companies to examine Kittatinny Ridge as a 
pumped storage site. During off-peak hours, power companies would pump water from a lower 
reservoir (Tocks) to a higher one and when power demands were high, the water would be 
returned to the lower reservoir to generate electricity. The three power companies purchased a 
785 acre portion of the Worthington property, including Sunfish Pond, fiom the state in 1961 and 
obtained permits fiom the Federal Power Commission. Their plans called for three reservoirs to 
be build on top of Kittatinny Mountain and the destruction of Sunfish Pond. Afler completing 
one phase of the project at Yards Creek, the other two planned reservoirs stalled because the 
DRBC now wanted rent money for use of water coming from Tocks Island Reservoir and also 
insisted the power companies help pay for part of the dam itself. 
Two nearby residents, Casey Kays, an avid hiker, and Glenn Fisher, a former United 
States Department of Agriculture employee, began a grassroots letter-writing campaign to save 
Sunfish Pond. Their efforts gained local media attention and support. Former New Jersey 
Governor Thomas Kean, at the time, junior assemblyman elected in 1967, became involved in 
this grassroots movement to save Sun Fish Pond fiom becoming the site of a pumped water 
storage facility. Kean, who then considered himself a conservationist, said he repeatedly 
submitted his bill to the New Jersey Assembly to save the site because "it was one of the few 
glacial lakes we have in New Jersey and we were losing too many of our scenic areas." Although 
Sun Fish Pond was saved, Kean's bill never gained any traction and his fellow New Jersey 
legislators jokingly called him "a bird watcher." "I didn't understand why I had three governors, 
the Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO and everybody else against me all of a sudden because 
of this little bill to save a small pond," recalled Kean. The pumped storage facility at Sun Fish 
Pond would have created valuable hydroelectric power and was slated to be one of the 
commercial components of the overall dam project used to financially justify it. 
"It became evident to me fairly soon that what I was fighting was the entire 
(Tocks Island) project and not just Sunfish Pond," said Kean. "I made it my prime 
cause and the more they opposed me, the more irritated and angrier I became and 
the harder I worked on it. Everybody was for it. All the governors were for it as 
well as all of the economic bosses. So people assumed it was going to happen and 
I was a fly in the ointment. They tried everything they could to get me to back off 
They even threatened my campaign contributions at one point."86 
The climax of grass roots publicity efforts to save Sunfish Pond came when United States 
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas joined a pilgrimage protest hike to the Pond on June 
17, 1967. "I wish to identifl myself strongly with this cause. Sunfish Pond is a unique spot and 
deserves to be preserved," said ~ o u ~ l a s .  87 
Albert noted that in 1968, a compromise between the DRBC and the power companies 
was reached. The state gave the utility companies one hundred acres of nearby land in a trade for 
Sunfish Pond and promises to landscape the unsightly upper reservoir dikes and hide all 
penstocks, generating plants and transmission lines so they could not be seen from Tocks Island 
Lake and the recreational area below. By June 1970, Congress had authorized pumped storage 
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power as a part of the Tocks Island Dam Project and the grassroots campaign to save Sunfish 
Pond had attracted the attention of those who wanted to stop Tocks Island Dam. 
"As early as 1968, Glenn Fisher and others were writing letters talking not only 
about the potential harm to the pond, but also about the loss of the free-flowing 
Delaware River, the loss of river bottomlands, the impact on ecology, water 
quality and other issues, " wrote Albert. "These were impacts anticipated from the 
construction of Tocks Island Dam and not fiom the pumped storage faci~it ies."~~ 
The controversy over Sunfish Pond in the mid 1960s had attracted public attention to the 
proposed Tocks Island Dam and National Park on the Delaware at the same time the 
environmental movement was just starting to gain national momentum, but any significant 
environmental opposition to the dam did not start until after 1970 mostly because the recreation 
area appealed to many traditional dam opponents and environmental causes in general had not 
gained widespread interest until after the first Earth Day in April of that year. Early resistance 
came fiom groups like the Delaware Valley Conservation Association, opposed to the national 
recreation area and the Save the Delaware Coalition, who were against the dam, but favored the 
recreation area despite the fact that it tripled the amount of private land to be taken by the 
government. In the next few years every possible environmental issue was subsequently raised, 
but despite these real or imagined later environmental impacts, the dam remained a victim of the 
Vietnam War, cost overruns and poor planning. Prices for land acquisition, geological site 
problems, cemetery and grave re-location and other costs had escalated or were unanticipated. 
The biggest opponents remained the doomed residents. 
Nancy Shukaitis, whose family had lived in the Minisink for generations, became the 
first local resident to oppose the dam when she testified alone during a 1964 Congressional 
hearing in Philadelphia. A natural leader and activist, she was later elected as a Monroe County 
Commissioner (freeholder) in 1967, a post she held for the next sixteen years, indicating 
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significant local support for her anti-dam agenda and fight against the federal government. 
Regional support for the dam began to erode and the Army Corps of Engineers became the local, 
on-site enemy. Albert wrote: 
Because of the delay in the start of construction, Tocks Island Dam got caught in 
a cross fire. Public interest in preserving the environment had been increasing . . 
By the 1970s, Tocks Island Dam would have been scrutinized closely by the 
environmentalists, if for no other reason than its sponsor was the hated United 
States Army Corps of ~ n ~ i n e e r s . ' ~  
Chickens and Traffic Jam the Dam 
The lack of hnding in the 1960s due to Vietnam War federal spending cutbacks became 
a real issue for the dam as costs escalated. During the 1970s it came under increasing fire and 
proponents were forced to head off more and more obstacles. As the seventies progressed, the 
two biggest concerns were diminished cost benefits and newly exposed environmental impacts. 
There were major concerns over limited recreational use of the reservoir because new 
engineering studies revealed that during times of drawdown, (which is the partial draining of the 
reservoir during times of low water flow or drought, especially during hot summer months) vast 
unsightly mudflats would grow along the lakeshore. A few years later other environmental 
impact studies indicated algae fed by phosphorescent groundwater runoff from nearby New York 
State chicken and dairy farms into the stagnant reservoir water would cause it to become a 
eutrophic gigantic cesspool unfit for recreation, which was supposed to make up 5 1 percent of 
the projects' congressionally mandated income benefit. New York State rehsed to absorb the 
cost of building expensive treatment facilities to control the agricultural ground water runoff 
coming from upstate New York. 
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In 1970, the DRBC commissioned its first environmental study of the project area, 
completed by Roy F. Weston, Inc. This initial environmental and engineering study made 
various recommendations to ensure the reservoir provided sufficient water supply, a sewage plan 
centrally administered by the DRBC, and engineering studies on solid waste disposal be 
conducted. Armed with the results of this environmental study, which was a relatively new field 
at the time, the Corps and dam supporters staunchly maintained the dam was still a workable 
project.g0 However, that year the dam supporters met their biggest obstacle. Even though Tocks 
Island Dam had been authorized before passage of the Nztional Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), the Army Corps was now required to produce an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) before any construction could begin. The EIS was to be prepared according to newly 
established guidelines set by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). In all fairness to the 
Corps, the CEQ guidelines were ambiguous and untested. In 1971, the Corps submitted a very 
short preliminary statement that outraged opponents and legislators alike. Although a more 
comprehensive report was already in the works, the Corps' initial and hurried short statement 
ignored environmental concerns, which raised suspicions. The CEQ countered by demanding the 
Corps address specific issues that included: water quality and potential eutrophication; 
alternatives to the dam; impacts on fish habitats in the Delaware; secondary costs and benefits, 
land use control and the impacts of seasonal fluctuations in reservoir levels. The CEQ 
recommended that construction of the Tocks Island Dam be delayed in the spring of 197lgiving 
the Corps time to satisfactorily address these issues. 
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In October 1971, the Corps issued its final EIS on the dam which determined that 
eventual eutrophication of the reservoir was likely because of sewage and animal waste runoff 
from upstream chicken farms in New York and again recommended a large wastewater treatment 
system was the solution. This more comprehensive one-hundred page long environmental impact 
report identified many other adverse impacts from the dam, the recreation area and the pumped 
storage project. Those impacts included: traffic jams; waste disposal and sewage treatment; 
adverse impacts on the fish population; exposure of mudflats during reservoir drawdowns; loss 
of agricultural lands and historic landmarks; the loss of historic Old Mine Road and the 
Pahaquarry Copper Mine; loss of wildlife and natural habitat andthe hardships imposed on 
current residents about to lose their homes. In February 1972, the Environmental Defense Fund 
published its own evaluation of the Tocks Island Project. This document admitted that 
"legitimate needs for water supply, flood damage prevention, outdoor recreation, and peaking 
power exist in the Delaware River Basin," but it disputed that Tocks Island Dam was the best 
way to meet these needs. The report criticized the Corps' calculations and studies of the Tocks 
Island Reservoir water supply hnction as inadequate and misleading and claimed the Corps 
overestimated the recreational benefits of the dam. In terms of flood control, the report stated 
that, instead of constructir~g a large dam, the DRBC should use floodplain management to reduce 
flooding risks at various tributary points. Finally, the report declared that "accelerated cultural 
eutrophication would have serious detrimental effects on the use of Tocks Island Reservoir for 
water supply and recreation" and insisted that the Corps require the DRl3C "to implement an 
adequate waste water treatment and control program for both point (municipal and industrial) 
and nonpoint (agricultural) waste water sources" before beginning constru~tion.~~ Russell Train, 
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chairman of the CEQ, agreed with many of these criticisms and approached the governors of 
New York and other states in the Delaware River Basin to receive assurances that New York 
would take measures to prevent nutrient runoff into the reservoir and that Delaware, 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey would provide fimding for a wastewater treatment system. When 
these assurances were not forthcoming, Congress officially stopped the construction of Tocks 
Island Dam in the summer of 1972. The Corps had been ready to advertise for construction bids, 
but these issues jeopardized the Corps' continued funding. In June of 1973, both the House and 
the Senate approved a $14.8 million appropriation, but stipulated it was to be used for property 
acquisition only and not construction. 
Governor Cabill's Roadblock 
Governor William Cahill, who had supported the dam at one time, announced New 
Jersey was going to re-evaluate its support for the project through a team at the state's newly 
created Department of Environmental Protection, headed by Commissioner Richard J. Sullivan 
and aided by Assistant Thomas M. O'Neill. Sullivan's team reviewed the costs and benefits to 
New Jersey separately and the possibility of New Jersey withdrawing its support loomed. Based 
on their report and recognizing the flood control benefit and additional water the dam could 
provide, Cahill told fellow members of the DRBC that New Jersey would not oppose the dam, 
but he insisted certain conditions be met before any construction started. "I did not condemn the 
dam," said Cahill. "We should identify as accurately as possible all elements of the project, 
including those things which indirectly will accompany it. . . we have not adequately carried out 
Philadelphia District, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
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this assignment in three areas."92 Cahill felt those three critical areas were the impact on land 
use of the dam and recreational area and the supplemental facilities needed; the cost, 
appropriateness, and environmental impact of proposed regional sewerage facilities and the 
highway system needed to serve the estimated number of annual visitors, which was 10.5 
million. 
Cahill was concerned about over-development of the areas surrounding the proposed park 
and the glut of restaurants, stores, gas stations and hotels that would spring up, especially in 
northwestern New Jersey. "Officials of these communities expressed to me their urgent concern 
about the costs of more hospital rooms and service, ambulances, police and fire protection and 
the upgrading of municipal and county roads," said Cahill. "The Tocks Island region of Warren 
and Sussex Counties will experience severe pressures for commercial development . . . the 
impact will be great." Cahill insisted the number of visitors be reduced to no more than four 
million a year and that over-night camping facilities be provided within the park to reduce traffic 
and development. He felt this reduction would be easily done "if the recreation area is provided 
without the big impoundment of the dam."93 The Weston report had recommended construction 
of a massive sewerage treatment system to cope with the agricultural run-off from New York 
that called rur h e  construction of a huge treatment plant and a system of intcrccptors running 
through miles of vacant countryside. Cahill felt this proposal adopted by the DRBC was too 
expensive and unsightly. Instead he and his team proposed constructing a series of smaller 
treatment facilities that would serve existing townships. Cahill went on to the question the 
benefits of the dam for water supply and flood control and demanded a total of seven conditions 
9 2 
"Statement Concerning the Tocks Island Dam" by William T. Cahill, Governor of New Jersey, given during the 
annual meeting of the Delaware River Basin Commission, May 10,1972. Document copy given to Kathleen Duca- 
Sandberg by Thomas O'Neill, former executive with NJ DEP. 
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be met before New Jersey would agree to move ahead with the project. The most important of 
these were: changes to the sewerage treatment plans to control the nutrient run-off and 
eutrophication control; the ability to regulate land use on the Jersey side of the Tocks Island 
region; federal funding for ncw highway projects to alleviate the burden to New Jersey's 
infrastructure; and federal subsidies to offset lost tax revenues due to federal land acquisition. 
O'Neill said Cahill's real damage to the dam, however, came fi-om his demand that the estimated 
10 million annual visitors to the recreation area be cut by more than half. O'Neill said: 
He was raising questions and putting up a caution sign not a stop sign. He gave 
the commission 6 months to come up with answers. His reaction was this project 
is not going to fly. This put the first substantial roadblock in the way of the dam 
without any real friction. This is what slowed down Tocks and eventually made it 
possible to stop it. What he really did was make it impossible to comply with his 
requests. If you put a ceiling of 4 million park visitors a year on it, they (the Army 
Corps) would not be able to get a positive cost benefit analysis. The corps could 
no longer justifjr it, not on environmental grounds; they could not justifjr it on 
economic grounds. They would not be able to get over the Congressional hurdle 
of having a positive cost benefit ratio.94 
In order to be able to afford the highways and the sewers, visitor levels had to be held to 
no more than 4 million people, which was the number of people you could have with a flowing 
river recreation area as opposed to a flat water recreation area (lake) and the bulk of the benefits 
the Corps used in their cost benefit analysis did not come from flood control or from water 
resources, but from recreation. There were environmental concerns, economic concerns and 
political concerns. Local officials Cahill had met with were now adamantly opposed to the 
project. "It was one of the first official examples of NIMBY not in my backyard. Cahill put these 
challenges in the way of the project," said ~ ' N e i l l . ~ ~  
94 Interview with Thomas O'Neill, former Executive Assistant and Chief of Staff to the Commissioner of the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection under both New Jersey Governors Cahill and Byrne, March 1,2011 
by Kathleen Duca-Sandberg. 
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Support for the dam was diminishing and construction was stalled indefinitely. Many 
credit Cahill and the Sullivan report for essentially stopping the dam, but the Army Corps would 
not give up. The Corps disagreed with these conclusions, stating that "the Tocks Island Project 
meets . . . urgent human requirements in a manner that is more environmentally acceptable, 
efficient and economic than any other series of known or feasible alternatives." The DRBC also 
declared that without any alternatives "the Tocks Island Reservoir would be the keystone of the 
water supply management program in the Delaware ~ a l l e ~ . " ~ ~  
After the Army Corps' initial and inadequate environmental impact statement was 
publicized, environmentalists got involved in the fight to stop the dam, yet they supported the 
recreation area and wanted to keep a natural wilderness setting along the river. The National Park 
Service developed a new plan, A Natural System Plan for the Delaware Water Gap National 
Recreation Area, released in September, 1971. Albert said support for large-scale recreational 
lake within the Park Service was eroding. "The natural systems plan deemphasized reservoir 
recreation . . . the results of the park service study delighted the environmentalists. Here was 
justification for their dam opposition," said ~1be1-t.'~ 
Park Superintendant John Donahue, who has written some history of Tocks Island Dam 
arid was a friend of author Richard Albert, said the growth of opposition to thc dam was "m 
event where you can tie a direct nexus between the event and the beginning of the growing 
environmental movement. It morphed from a movement about people keeping their homes into 
being a movement about seeing that the sacrifice they were making was for a good cause- 
public lands in perpetuity."98 
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During the next few years numerous impact and engineering studies were conducted 
including investigations into various water-supply and flood control alternatives. The 
Environmental Defense Fund, who questioned the dam's costs and benefits in 1972, now found 
that construction of the dam would encourage development on the dangerous floodplains below 
the dam. As Cahill pointed out, during the devastating Flood of 1955, it was not the main stem of 
the Delaware River that had caused so much damage and fatalities, but its' various creeks and 
tributaries within the floodplain, where homes and camp facilities were swept away. Donahue 
said years later the Corps, who continued to test the area, concluded that there were serious 
engineering issues with the Tocks Island site. "The place where they wanted to build the dam 
turned out to be one of the few places in Pennsylvania where you can 't drill down six inches and 
find rock. There was nothing but sand," said ~onahue.'' O'Neill said he believed this still would 
not have stopped the Corps from building the dam. They would have resorted to using an 
alternative building method instead. 
There were still many who continued to support the dam including Pennsylvania 
Governor Milton Shapp, the Delaware Valley Council, the New Jersey State Chamber of 
Commerce, various labor unions and of course Dressler and members of the WRA-DRB, who 
fought back and "had an equally persuasive argument for rejecting every proposed alternative," 
wrote Albert. "The technical battleground would decide nothing. The real argument was 
ideological, either you believed that Tocks Island Dam was the long-awaited answer to the water 
needs of the Delaware River Basin, or you didn't. It was like religion."'00 
The fate of Tocks Island Dam, however, still rested with Congress and the Delaware 
River Basin Commission, or essentially the four governors of New York, Pennsylvania, 
99 Ibid. 
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Delaware, and New Jersey. By 1973 the DRBC countered CEQ and Governor Cahill's objections 
to the dam by changing its policies regarding "nonpoint" pollution-the chicken and cow 
agricultural groundwater runoff from precipitation. It was now to be managed in accordance with 
the policies being developed at the federal levcl by the Environmental Protection Agency, an 
attempt to divorce the issue from the dam controversy and pass the buck. Some of Cahill's other 
conditions were being met, including a reduction in the number of park visitors and agreeing to 
build sub-regional sewage treatment plants, but Cahill still demanded federal funding for 
highways and lost tax revenues, which was a shift away fkom any lingering environmental 
concerns as far as New Jersey was concerned. The CEQ kept insisting New York State provide a 
clean-up program to remove 95 percent of any agricultural wastes. Once again in 1973, both the 
House and the Senate approved funding for dam construction, but insisted construction could 
only begin if these issues were resolved. 
Governor Brendan Byrne's White Paper and the Critical Vote Against Tocks 
The Delaware River Basin Compact required all water resource projects be approved by 
the DRBC and Congress had become impatient with the DRBC's delays. The fact that two 
governors now opposed construction proved problematic. Congress pushed the Delaware River 
Basin Commission to resolve the dam controversy. On August 28, 1974 Congress appropriated 
$1.5 million for a new study of the Tocks Island Dam project, but instead of giving the money to 
the Department of Environmental Protection or the National Academy of Sciences to conduct the 
study, it gave it to the Army Corps of Engineers. This immediately caused panic and distrust 
among those who opposed the dam and who feared this new study would be biased if managed 
by the Corps. Instead two neutral New York City consulting firms were given the contract, 
engineers URS/Madigan-Praeger and the architectural firm, Conklin and Rossant. Their six- 
volume final report assessed the costs of various alternatives, but did not take a position on the 
dam itself It again raised numerous environmental and financial concerns that resulted in a 
stalemate with both sides declaring victory. It concluded that the project was the most cost- 
effective means to achieve the purposes of flood control, water supply, recreation, and 
hydroelectric development in the region, however, they believed recreation would be adversely 
affected by eutrophication. The Army Corps interpreted the results differently saying the 
Madigan-Praeger study viewed the dam as both feasible and necessary. 
In 1974, Brendan Byrne became governor of New Jersey, Malcolm Wilson succeeded 
Rockefeller as governor of New York and Delaware's new governor was Sherman Tribbitt. After 
Sullivan resigned the DEP, but before Byrne appointed David Bardin to succeed him, Joseph T. 
Barber was named Acting Commissioner of the DEP under Byrne. He had been a division 
director before DEP was established when it was still the New Jersey Department of 
Conservation and Economic Development. "He was an old time Democratic hack-build-a-dam- 
guy, who had enough republican connections to maintain an ofice under the Cahill 
administration," said 0 ' ~ e i l l ' ~ '  In March 1974, Byrne asked Barber for comments on what he 
ought to do about Tocks arid Barber encouraged the governor to build the dam. Hc pointcd out 
Cahill's seven conditions and brushed each one off in a short two page memo. He claimed the 
eutrophication issue was overemphasized and plans to build a major regional sewerage system 
had already been abandoned in favor of a decentralized system. He also said there was no need 
for more highway construction since the number of visitors had been scaled back to 4 million. "I 
believe that action and studies by DRBC and the Corps and other agencies compromise a 
reasonable response and assurance that the issues will be resolved," wrote Barber. "It is my 
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feeling that the completion of this project is imperative." His reasons were Tocks would provide 
water supply for "which there is no alternative" and a source of energy and power plant cooling 
water and its flood control use."Only a main stem facility can prevent a repetition of the 1955 
disaster downstream. Surveyed in its entirety, it appears that the benefits from the Tocks Island 
Dam far outweigh its problems and I would strongly suggest that you fully support this project so 
that construction can proceed in 1974. "Io2 
"This is what would have happened without Richard Sullivan or David Bardin. This was 
the old politicians answer to what we should do about Tocks," declared 0Nei11.'03 
In conjunction with the new congressionally mandated study being done by Madigan- 
Praeger and Conklin, Byrne asked for a new study of the dam project and the potential impacts 
on New Jersey. A new task force was headed by OWeill and Dr. Glenn Paulson, also an assistant 
DEP Commissioner, who helped create the state's Supefind cleanup program as well as the 
Department's Office of Science and Research. The two began a lengthy new study of Tocks 
Island Dam and the recreation area they called "The Decision Options Paper" or "The White 
Paper." ONeill said the great virtue of this independent study was that everyone could use the 
consultants' numbers and findings. He said a review committee met weekly with the engineering 
f i~x is  and everyone had to be satisfied. "We used their numbcrs and then fit our policy 
preferences to it. That way we lessened the argument from an analytic point of view. The state 
simply had very limited analytic plans. It had never been done before," said 0 ' ~ e i l l ' ~ ~  
"He (Governor Byrne) wanted a fresh look (at the dam) based on the current 
circumstances of the mid 1970s, not a judgment that was dating back to the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~ "  noted 
102 Memorandum from Joseph T. Barber to Governor Brendan T. Byrne, Subject: Tocks Island, (March 22, 1974) 
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Paulson. "He had an open mind. If the perceived needs of decades earlier were still the needs of 
today or if there were new needs that justified it . . . then his position would be in favor of it." On 
the other hand, if the needs were no longer valid, Byrne would oppose the dam and support 
alternatives, said ~ a u l s o n . ' ~ ~  "It was a close call for Byrne. He might have gone either way. He 
was not a real environmentalist," said New Jersey historian, Donald Linky, who served as Policy 
and Planning Director and Chief Counsel to ~ ~ r n e . " ~  07Neill said he thought Byrne made a gut 
decision using the White Paper to support a decision he already believed in 
"Governors don't want to take firm policy stands unless they have to," said 
07Neill. "They prefer to make decisions on grounds that are unassailable. This 
way is going to cost us more money than that. Why get into the controversy of 
agreeing or not?"07 
Another argument of this thesis is that even though New Jersey Governor Byrne voted 
against building Tocks Island Dam in the mid 1970s, an act which ultimately led to de- 
authorization, this decision was not based on environmental concerns. It was predominantly the 
anticipated costs to New Jersey. Paulson and O'Neill, who wrote the report for Bardin, concluded 
that New Jersey had adequate alternative water supplies and that the proposed Tocks Island 
reservoir, depending on the rainfall and snow melt in a given year, could rise and fall many tens 
of feet, which meant that proposed marinas would often be dry and there would be huge mud 
flats, "so the recreational values basically had they been asserted were a sham," said Paulson 
"Maybe one year out of every several the marinas would have been wet." 
O'Neill said land use impact was the most obvious and detrimental aspect of the 
recreational lake and the fact that eutrophication would impact of the number of visitor days. 
105 lnterview with Dr. Glenn Paulson, by Donald Linky, the Eagleton Institute of Politics, (May 14,2009) 
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"The study was not designed to tell you-yes, you should build tocks or not," said 
07Neill. "It was designed to give an accepted basis of fact and analysis that both 
sides could agree on and use as a basis for their analysis. The stunning conclusion 
to us was, we did not need Tocks for water supply. In fact we'd be better off 
without it for water supply purposes in terms of costs per gallon and those were 
costs that we, New Jersey had to meet. It would have been unaffordable for New 
~ e r s e ~ .  " lo8 
Based on the "White Paper" Bardin urged Byrne to consider alternative water resources 
that included improvements at the Ramapo, Round Valley, Confluence, Six-Mile Run, Two 
Bridges and the Raritan-Passaic Reserviors, the D & R Canal and future conservation measures. 
"The New Jersey share of the $120 million estimated water supply fraction of the Tocks Island 
Lake would be $44 million, but this would not be available until pipelines were built from the 
Delaware to the Raritan and then hooked up. Consumption has not kept up with projections . . . it 
would virtually eliminate growth in water demand through 2025. New Jersey seems unlikely to 
need the Tocks increment for from 25 to 50 years . . . it would be desirable to preserve the option 
to build the dam and the lake, but to defer the actual construction," wrote Commissioner Bardin. 
"If you believe that a large new lake would be an attractive amenity in pace of the existing 
valley, and if you believe it is worth $3 11 million of federal tax money excluding $42 million to 
complete land acquisition, you will favor the dam and lake project . . . If you prefer a free- 
flowing river for at least a generation," Bardin advised Byrne to wait and weight the drought and 
flood risks along with more flexible water resource alternatives that would be less expensive for 
New ~ e r s e ~ . ' " ~  Again, it was a matter of the costs and Paulson said a day or two after receiving 
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"Report and Recommendations on Tocks Island Dam and Lake to Governor Brendan T. Byrne" from David 
Bardin, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, July 29, 1975 based on the 
OINeill and Paulson "Decision Options Paper" or "The White Paper" copy given to Kathleen Duca-Sandberg by 
Thomas O'Neill. 
their report Byrne came out against the dam. "And without the support of one of the governors 
in the three states it basically was a dead issue," said ~ a u l s o n " ~  
Governor Byrne recalled: 
I've had second thoughts about supporting it once in a while. The initial reasons 
for building the dam all seemed very logical, (but) there was a lot of negative 
press and squatters protesting. It was more of a social issue. I did not care about 
the dam one way or other. I knew there were people, who were concerned about 
the issue of water supply, but mostly it was just getting a lot of negative media 
coverage and I had the impression that nobody had thought through all of the 
possible effects. They didn't know how they were going to deal with the 
eutrophication and I could see scum."' 
Byrne went on to say that the entire project was a media headache for him and agreed that the 
lack of funding in the 60s opened doors later for the environmental movement to make Tocks 
Island their cause. 
Yes delays from a lack of hnding during LBJ resulted in a lack of appropriations 
to the Army Corps-it could have given the environmentalists a window of time 
later, but all that did not come into my thinking when I called the shots. It was 
really more trouble than it was worth. It was best if the whole thing just went 
away. So we kept the park and got rid of the dam."' 
Byrne said that he decided to continue pursuing the route Governor Cahill had started by 
insisting the number of annual visitors be restricted to four million a year thereby 
diminishing the project's mandated cost-benefit. O'Neill recalled: 
Yes and that was their biggest problem. They had to try to do that balance sheet 
that didn't really work. They were congressionally mandated to prove a cost 
benefit and that became the easiest part of it to attack because you couldn't argue 
that the cost benefit was fast disappearing and legally they would not be allowed 
to build it. 
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O'Neill said once he was given the White Paper, Byrne's overriding concern was the cost 
effectiveness of building the dam.'% was the politically salient concern he had. It was not 
an environmental concern, it's a money concern and everybody can understand that," said 
~ ' N e i l l " ~  
With environmental and local opposition mounting, the DRBC met on July 3 1, 1975 to 
make a firm decision about whether or not to support the dam. During this meeting, Governor 
Byrne, armed with the White Paper, voiced his opposition to the dam, but did not vote to 
completely kill the project. He believed New Jersey had sufficient water supply without Tocks 
Island Dam, but wanted to keep New Jersey's options open if the state ever needed more water in 
the future. New York Governor Hugh Carey (represented by Ogden R. Reid) and Delaware 
Governor Sherman Tribbitt also voted to withdraw DRBC support for the dam, while 
Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp voted in favor of the project. As the 1975 annual report for 
the Water Resources Association of the Delaware River Basin declared, "The Delaware River 
Basin Commission on July 3 1, in a closed meeting decided, in a split decision, against 
construction start at Tocks Island but for continuation of land acquisition for the Delaware Water 
Gap National Recreation Area." Without DRBC support, the Army Corps recommended 
Congress de-authori~e the dam in September 1975, stating that the Corps should transfer the land 
it had acquired for the project to the National Park Service for the Delaware Water Gap National 
Recreation Area. In the course of subsequent hearings, Major General Ernest Graves, Director of 
Civil Works for the Corps, explained that Tocks Island Dam was "the key feature" in the 
Delaware River Basin Comprehensive Plan and that the Corps would have to "go fairly far back 
toward first base in order to put together a plan that would be workable," but if the DRBC did 
not support the project, it was better to deauthorize it than to let it linger. According to Graves, 
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the Corps had expended approximately $63.5 million on Tocks Island up to that point, including 
553 man-years of manpower. 
The testimony of senators and representatives fiom New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
. and Pennsylvania highlighted this lack of support. Senators Clifford Case (R-New Jersey) and 
Jacob K. Javits (R-New York), as well as Representatives Robert W. Edgar @-Pennsylvania), 
Millicent Fenwick (R-New Jersey), Benjamin A. Gilman (R-New York), Pierre S. Du Pont (R- 
Delaware), and Helen Meyner (D-New Jersey) now all opposed the Tocks Island Project, with 
only Representatives Frank Thompson (D-New Jersey) and Edward J. Patten (D-New Jersey) 
coming out in favor of the dam. "The labor unions were really pushing for construction," recalled 
Linky, who said Charlie Marciante, then president of the state AFL-CIO withdrew his support 
for Byrne when he voted to temporarily stop the dam. Linky said there had been a number of 
New Jersey "pork barrel" interests in building the dam, including Congressman Robert Rowe 
from Passaic County, who was chair of the House Public Works Committee. "He was a very 
aggressive pork barrel guy to go to. He was a very big pro-development and construction guy. 
Getting federal appropriations was viewed as a feather in their cap," said Linky. "' 
Residents continued to voice opposition to the dam. "Those of us familiar with the area 
had a responsibility to speak up about this matter, surely beforc construction took place," said 
Shutaitis, who also testified for de-authorization. Shukaitis disputed that the dam could 
effectively fulfill its major purposes, such as flood control and water supply and it would be 
better to explore alternatives. Likewise, Harold A. Lockwood, Jr., of both the Save the Delaware 
Coalition and the Sierra Club, declared that the dam had been rehashed, restudied, reviewed and 
reanalyzed for many years and that the time had come to deauthorize it so that the Delaware 
River Basin Commission could get on with meaninghl planning and avoid the conhsion and 
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chaos of the last 14 years. Tom Eichler of the New York Department of Environmental 
Conservation, called Congress's attention to the project's "serious shortcomings," claiming that 
its construction would force New York citizens to assume an even larger financial burden to 
control phosphorous discharges to the upper Delaware River. Yet several individuals appeared 
before the subcommittee in support of the project. Maurice K. Goddard, secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, represented Governor Shapp' s position 
on Tocks Island. He said the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania continued its support for the 
immediate construction of the Tocks Island Dam and Reservoir project as it had since the project 
was first conceived. According to Goddard, deauthorizing Tocks Island would merely "put us 
right back to the point where we were 20 years ago, with no immediate means of meeting the 
present and future water and water-related needs of the citizens and industry of the four-State 
basin and its service area." In a similar way, Joseph F. Radziul of the Philadelphia Water 
Department, explained that Tocks Island was the only means to ensure that the Delaware River 
Basin would not have "a serious water shortage7' in fiture years. 116 
While not supporting immediate construction of Tocks Island, others advocated 
continued authorization of the project in the event the need ever became apparent. James W. 
Wright, executive director of the DRBC and a representative of Governor Tribbitt of Delaware, 
for example, stated that "too many issues remain unresolved as this time to risk the permanent 
foreclosure of the Tocks Island Lake project." Wright was especially concerned about salt water 
intrusion and whether nonstructural flood control measures could provide an adequate amount of 
protection. "Although the Delaware River Basin Commission member-states voted 3-to-1 against 
a motion recommending congressional appropriation of Tocks Island construction finds," 
116 Albert, p. 157-158. 
Wright concluded, "only New York among the four member States has expressed support for 
deauth~rization.""~ Congress passed no deauthorization bill in 1976 or in the years immediately 
thereafter. The Tocks Island Dam project hung in limbo. 
Environmentalists Finally Help Stop the Dam 
With the possibility of the dam still lingering, environmental groups and opponents 
aimed to ensure that no construction ever occurred by getting Congress to designate the Middle 
Delaware River as a wild and scenic river. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, passed by Congress 
in 1968, declared that rivers with "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish 
and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values" would be "preserved in fiee-flowing 
condition.""* President Jimmy Carter signed the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, 
adding the segment from the point where the Delaware River crosses the northern boundary of 
the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area to the point where the river crosses the 
southern boundary of the recreation area to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System to the 
system. In addition, the act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to include all of the Tocks 
Island Dam lands in the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area and to acquire any 
additional land which the Corps had not yet purchased. In essence, the passage of this legislation 
protected the Delaware River and blocked Tocks Island Dam. The same bill, which critics 
dubbed, "The Park Barrel Bill," provided parks and recreation areas in forty-four states, three 
territories and over 48 percent of the congressional districts in the nation. The inclusion of the 
Delaware River and this designation was a victory that can be truly attributed to the 
117 S. 3106, "A Bill to terminate the authorization for the Tocks Island Reservoir Project as part of the Delaware 
River Basin project, and for other purposes," copy in Senate Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Committee 
on Public Works, Tocks bland Deauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the 
Committee on Public Works, United States Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, various testimony, pgs, 3-198 
118 Albert, p 150. 
environmental movement, primarily the national Environmental Defense Fund, but as it has been 
explained and reviewed previously, the dam was already mortally wounded, (although not quite 
dead yet.) Pennsylvania was still bitterly lobbying for the dam and New Jersey had left itself a 20 
year window of opportunity to reassess its water supply needs. 
Albert wrote, "Deauthorization of Tocks Island Dam was the next item on the 
environmental agenda."'" Clearly, this was an overstatement. For many years, only New York 
State favored deauthorization, but not for environmental reasons. Various House and Senate bills 
recommending deauthorization were repeatedly introduced during the next decade and all failed. 
The dam had lost support of the DRBC and the Army Corps, it's principle players. Yet while 
support in Congress waned, there remained many political supporters and legal and technical 
issues, primarily the Supreme Court Decree of 1954, which had divided the waters of the 
Delaware in the first place and was later satisfied by a regulatory Good Faith Agreement. Brig. 
General James Kelley, the head of the Corps North Atlantic Division recommended the project 
be deauthorized so that alternative water resources plans could be implemented. Finally, 
Congress passed the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 which revamped the Corps of 
Engineers' public works programs, stipulating all inactive projects, including Tocks, be 
automatically deauthorized if no hnding had been expended on them for ten years. This law was 
responsible for the automatic deauthorization of Tocks Island Dam in 1992. 
By 1992, the protestors and environmentalists had long since abandoned the Minisink 
Valley. "The environmental community dropped the ball when the Park Service showed up," 
said Barry Allen, now associate professor of Environmental Studies at Rollins College, and a 
former resident of Flatbrookville and principle organizer in the fight to stop the dam in the 
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seventies. "People were concerned about the residents losing their homes, but after the dam 
received the Wild and Scenic Rivers designation, both the environmentalists and the Army Corps 
pulled out. The Park Service did nothing to preserve the cultural landscape. The historic value of 
the area was lost. The environmentalists had dropped the 
Congress did not officially deauthorize the project until July, 1992 and only with the 
provision that the dam be retained in the DRBC's Comprehensive Plan and reviewed again after 
the year 2002. In November, 2000, sixty five miles of the lower Delaware River were added to 
the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System making seventy five percent of the non-tidal river 
between New York State and Trenton, untouchable. The remaining twenty-five percent is too 
small for a dam or reservoir. Former Governor Thomas Kean recalled: 
In the end it was a combination of factors that finally killed the project. 
Environmentalists went on later to make sure the dam could never happen when it 
received federal designation as a free-flowing river, but the issue of the dam was 
long dead and buried. It was a dead issue because of the cost benefit and that final 
study buried it.''' 
In February 1979, the Philadelphia District ended its official involvement with the Tocks 
Island Project by concluding the transfer of funds and property to the NPS. No longer involved 
with Tocks Island, the Philadelphia District did not have a robust workload and, in 1980, it saw 
its real estate fknction relocated to the Baltimore District, while engineering, design, and 
construction of new projects were also eliminated. By 198 1, the staffing of the District had 
decreased from nearly eight hundred to below six hundred, emphasizing the dramatic effect that 
the killing of the Tocks Island Project had on it. Recognizing that Tocks Island had an effect on 
the District's workload, some critics charged District officials with hanging on to the project just 
for that reason, even if they knew it was not economically or environmentally justified. Yet 
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Corps officials denied this, stating instead that they merely saw it as the best way to meet the 
region's needs and that they were just doing what Congress wanted them to do. "Tocks Island 
wasn't authorized by a cadre of evil bureaucrats," testified Army Corps Assistant Chief of 
EngineeringIConstruction Division John Burnes. "It was authorized by the Congress." 
Regardless, the demise of the project had a direct and severe impact on the Philadelphia 
District. '22 
The project also had a direct impact on the Delaware River Basin itself. Supporters of the 
project continued to believe that Tocks Island was the best solution and, at various times in the 
1980s and even into the twenty-first century, some talked about trying to resurrect the project. 
Whenever a drought or floods hit the area, a number of people continued to respond that a dam at 
Tocks Island is still the solution. Clearly, it was difficult for some to let go of Tocks Island, 
believing that it was the key to many of the water problems in the Delaware River Basin. In 
2002, after extensive research, the Tocks Island Dam Project was officially de-authorized by 
Congress. Albert concluded his book by saying it was the War in Vietnam that was the major 
reason for the demise of the Tocks Island Dam 
The idea was born in an era when an undammed river was considered a wasted 
resource and river taming was considered good water conservation. The 
momentum of this philosophy carried Tocks Island Dam to the start of 
construction, but it was not enough. It was the Vietnam War, however, that kept 
the project from being built. In many respects, Tocks Island was the Vietnam War 
of the Delaware Valley. As the cost of achieving the underlying goals escalated, 
they became confused and were questioned. In 1975 both the dam and the war 
collapsed from weakened political support and rising public pressure.123 
lu House Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Water 
Resources Problems Affecting the Northeast: The Drought, and Present and Future Water Supply Problems: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 
House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981,797. 
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The long delay in starting Tocks Island in the 1960s eventually caused its demise. 
Ultimately, deauthorization in 1979 and establishment of the Delaware Water Gap National 
Recreation Area eliminated serious consideration of a large, main-stem reservoir for control of 
floods and droughts on the Delaware River. In the aftermath, the DRBC focused on the 
development of rules, regulations and procedures to deal with drought and water conservation 
policies entered DRBC7s project review process. The WRAKIRB maintained close ties to the 
DRBC and worked on each of these initiatives, providing technical and policy input and 
providing information to its members and the broader public. The DRBC undertook and 
completed a "Level B study in May, 1981 to identify alternatives to Tocks Island Dam and this 
time they emphasized public participation in the study process. 
Residents Finally Get a Voice 
Congress established the Citizen Advisory Commission on October 31, 1988, to advise 
the Secretary of the Interior on matters pertaining to the management and operation of the 
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, as well as on other matters affecting its 
surrounding communities, re-chartering this Federal citizen's advisory committee in 1998 for an 
additivrial decade. The Secretary of the Interior now appoints the eleven-member committee, 
which consists of two members nominated by the Governor of New Jersey, two members 
nominated by the Governor of Pennsylvania, two members nominated by the Superintendent of 
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, and five County members, nominated by the 
county administrations of Sussex and Warren Counties in NJ and Pike, Monroe, and 
Northampton Counties in Pennsylvania. 
When re-authorization expired in October 2008, Representatives Scott Garret (R-NJ) and 
Christopher Carney (D-PA) introduced a bipartisan bill (H.R. 3476) to reauthorize the Delaware 
Water Gap National Recreation Area Citizens Advisory Commission through 2018, saying 
"Communication is the key to addressing and resolving citizen concerns, and it is clear that 
residents and park users value the opportunity to respond to park decisions, as well as propose 
alternative ideas." This bill passed the House of Representatives on October 13,2009. 
CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
Rivers have long been a battleground between those who want to keep them free flowing 
and natural and those who want to harness water to create improvements. There are more than 
75,000 dams in the United States that affect every major river outside Alaska but one, the 
Salmon River in Idaho. In addition to 400 large dams used to control floods, as of 1965 these 
dams created more than 26,000 miles of channeled waterways for shipping, 58,000 million acres 
of irrigated land and the generation of 30 million kilowatts of hydroelectricity. While these 
improvements have been deemed significantly beneficial and essential, river conservationists 
have claimed the most complete and permanent destruction of a river is by a dam. Environmental 
studies have shown when a dam stops the river's current, the landscape is flooded, the chemistry 
and temperature of the water changes and deep water blocks sunlight and stops the growth of 
bacteria and other food chain nutrients. Traditionally paid for by the federal government, the cost 
of building a dam has drawn negative criticism as well. Cost estimates have increased 
dramatically since Tocks Island dam was first proposed at only $75 million in 1 965. By 1 983 the 
cost of building a dam in California was estimated at $2.2 billion.'24 
There has only been only one very comprehensive book written about the history of 
Tocks Island, but the author, Richard Albert, was undoubtedly an anti-dam environmentalist and 
wrote it with that slant. The end of the Tocks Island dam project has always been viewed as a 
victory for the growing environmental movement, but there was more to the story and it was 
simply a matter of money and time. Tocks Island Dam became irrevocably log-gammed during 
124 Interview with Tim Palmer, river historian and conservationist, author of "Endangered Rivers and the 
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the Carter Administration, but its demise really happened earlier when President Johnson needed 
funding to simultaneously fight the War in Vietnam and push through his key domestic 
programs. "Guns or Butter" handed the growing environmental movement this later victory. 
Budget cuts for smaller projects and programs delayed Tocks Island long enough for it to later 
become economically and environmentally unfeasible, especially after the enactment of the 
National Environmental Protection Act. In studying the history of Tocks Island Dam, the 
possibility of this argument had to be taken into account 
Did the environmental movement really cause the demise of Tocks Island Dam and did 
environmentalists successfully stop other dams from being built elsewhere? In the late 1990s, 
within only a few years of the final deauthorization of Tocks Island Dam, more than 450 new 
dam projects were authorized for construction by the Army Corps of Engineers. River 
conservationist, Tim Palmer said that even during the War in Vietnam other dams were still 
being built despite critical domestic spending shortages, all depending on the amount of 
Congressional support they had and if construction was already underway. "Dam projects were 
still being hnded then. It depended totally on congressional support for specific projects. 
By all means, this project should have been one of many cut by the Johnson administration due 
to a lack of funding. 11 had 1101 been started yet and there was no significant national reason to 
keep it except for the tremendous lobbying efforts of those who had "pork barrel" economic 
interests in the project such as the WRAIDRB or politicians such as John Saylor, Frank 
Thompson or Mike Rowe. O'Neill agreed. 
Other dams were being built and they didn't have the opposition that Tocks did. 
You talk about building dams out west. There aren't as many people per square 
mile as there are in New Jersey. They don't have the same education level or the 
income level as people in the east. This is a rich, well-educated, densely populated 
125 Tim Palmer Interview. 
state where it is hard to do anything, let alone build a dam without having some 
citizens group coming out against it. This is a difficult place to get things done. 
The degree of backing by the environmental movement in the seventies was 
highly correlated to the degree of income and education level.'26 
Was the demise of the Tocks Island Dam project really a "win" for the environmental 
movement? At first glance and from a present day environmental history outlook, the answer 
would be yes because no dam was built and the river was preserved. However, there were 
actually two finales to the Tocks Island Dam project and they needed to be chronologically 
separated and examined. The real demise of the dam was between 1965 and 1970, when federal 
finding was diverted from the project to pay for the War in Vietnam and poor planning resulted 
in diminished cost benefits. This happened years before any significant environmental movement 
had taken up the cause to stop the dam's construction. The second effort dragged on for years 
before legislation was finally enacted to stop the dam, once and for all, but these efforts were "au 
fait accompli." 
Viewed historically, the second demise, later in the 1970s considered the "environmental 
win," was largely after-the-fact, and a controversy culturally created by the media and state 
politicians. This later controversy surrounding the dam was orchestrated primarily by the victims 
of social engirleel ing whu had formed coalitions with well-intcntioncd wilderness 
conservationists, hippie squatters and some people who might be legitimately considered modern 
environmentalists. Regardless of their environmental or altruistic values and motives, the people 
who were losing their homes were not as concerned about displacing shad and oysters as they 
were about losing the roofs over their heads. These were the people who officially spear-headed 
the controversy and were repeatedly interviewed by the press or caught on camera angrily 
demonstrating with a mixture of concerned citizens. Although the Army Corps of Engineers 
126 O'Neill Interview. 
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continued to push ahead, every year their budget was reduced and federal interest waned. Tocks 
Island dam was fkndamentally a dead issue years before this second group of "environmental" 
supporters took credit for officially halting the project.. 
The second and later environmental controversy that continued until 1992 and even 2002, 
may have served as an ecological epiphany for some, but in the 1960s there were still very few 
sympathetic legislators capable of enacting laws to protect the environment and actually not 
much widespread public support for local environmental causes. The first Earth Day on April 22, 
1970, marked the beginning of the modern environmental movement and attracted national 
attention. Even then, opposition to Tocks Island dam was still considered by many to be a 
grassroots movement that was used by the overall emerging environmental movement to gain 
traction. There was little unity among environmentalists on the Tocks Island project. They 
differed on the size of the national park, how many people should be allowed to visit annually, 
development of the areas surrounding the park and who should regulate land-use, among other 
issues. The State of New Jersey had no master development plan or the means to implement one. 
Ironically, it was the hated Corps of Engineers who rightly argued that the creation of the 
national park actually saved the surrounding areas, primarily the northwestern corner of New 
Jersey, fi-om fbture con~n~ercial nd residential over-dcvclopmcnt. Even today Routes 206,23 
and 15 that traverse northern New Jersey are choked with traffic on weekends, mostly with cars 
bearing out of state license plates heading towards the Pocono region. 
Of course in the mid to late 1960s most elected officials and economic decision makers 
did not consider "the environment." They were conservationists, born of the Teddy Roosevelt old 
school of preserving natural resources as just that, resources to be used for man's benefit. Even 
Former Governor Kean, who later stopped offshore oil drilling and the dumping of medical 
waste that was washing up on Jersey shore beaches, implementing the Supefind Cleanup, and 
dioxin, radon, asbestos and acid rain programs, called himself a conservationist. Stuart Udall, 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior under both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson was one 
of the biggest supporters of building dams in the 1960s and certainly neither of his bosses was 
too concerned with environmental issues. Johnson's administration managed to pass legislation 
to stop the further pollution of air and water, but these were not proactive, protective measures-- 
they were reactive, crisis management issues that had found their way onto his plate, which was 
already full of social discontent and rhetoric about the War in Vietnam, the Civil Rights 
movement, the crushing budget deficit and inflation. Liberals, who were the earliest proponents 
of the environmental movement, were viewed to be same people giving Johnson a headache by 
protesting against the war, civil rights, women's rights, and other issues. 
Ecology never really became a significant issue in the Tocks Island Dam controversy 
until later or even after the deauthorization. Engineering studies uncovered and noted possible 
adverse impacts, but these remained largely inconclusive and politically insignificant. For 
example, if the dam was to cause changes to the salinity of the river's water, scientists believed it 
would adversely impact or "simplify" the number of species living in it and create an imbalance 
in the ecosystem, but at that time, no one knew wilh oer~ainty just how much of an impact it 
would have created. There just was not enough evidence to justify abandoning the dam because 
it might alter the natural environment. There was too much uncertainty. 
Emerging environmentalists like O'Neill and Paulson and even Governor Cahill had to 
fight people within the newly created New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, who 
thought the dam was the only way to meet New Jersey's water supply needs, an idea, which 
turned out to be completely without merit once the state and the DRBC conducted new studies 
and produced a master water plan and people began to conserve water much in the same way it 
became the norm to recycle. O'Neill recalled how much support the dam once had in state 
government. 
The bureaucracy thought the dam was a great thing to do. Under Governors 
Meyner and Hughes, this had been the project everyone wanted--old fashioned, 
democratic, public works, public power, build a dam, water power, conservation-- 
the old way of doing things. It was absolutely routine. The Corps of Engineers 
knew how to do this stuff and it was supported by the local politicians. But by the 
creation of the first Earth Day it proved that the world was changing and the 
atmosphere was changing. 127 
Early on, issues of suburban sprawl, land-use, transportation or eutrophication were not 
taken into consideration. No studies considered cost of living increases or population reductions 
that have occurred since then. No one agency took responsibility for oversight. Various agencies 
remained fragmented and did not coordinate their activities or analysis. Environmental values 
were still intangible and had not yet hlly become the responsibility of a single agency or mind- 
set. Significant environmental opposition was only organized after the first Environmental 
Impact Statement was issued by the Corps in the 1970s. Earlier, decision makers, who first put 
the dam into motion, did not have the benefit of environmental impact data or technical analysis. 
The construction of the Erie Canal or the Transcontinental Railroad in the 1860s most likely 
caused devastating environmental impacts, but no one thought about the endangered buffalo or 
land choking dust bowls. Tocks Island Dam was frozen in a half century of environmental 
transition that was provisional, unclear and tentative at best. O'Neill concluded. 
The environmental impact statement and other studies did not lead to an effective 
decision on the project. The point of any analysis in government, the point of the 
environmental impact statement, was not to make the right or wrong decision, but 
to define the issues that require a decision at the conclusion of the analysis. If the 
process simply leads to delay and conhsion then the analytical process 
incorporated into the environmental impact statement has failed. 12* 
127 O'Neill Interview. 
12' Ibid. 
Luckily, the long term goals of the environmental movement gained strength and 
survived primarily because of the National Environmental Protection Act. Since the 1970s, the 
majority of people came to realize that it is wrong to perpetuate urbanJsuburban sprawl or to cut 
down trees without replanting new ones or to kill animals close to extinction. The planet had 
grown smaller and as people became more aware of man's place in it and the damage being 
caused by carelessness and greed, the environmental movement became mainstream and 
accepted. At the time of Tocks Island we might have been on the way, but we still had a long 
way to go. 
"In retrospect, there is no doubt that the same territory would have lost its virgin natural 
resources had this aggressive land grab not take place" said Nancy Shyukaitis, who now in her 
mid-80s, is actively working to stop a proposed 146 mile, 500-kilovolt transmission line from 
being installed across eastern Pennsylvania and northern New Jersey, right through the middle 
of the Delaware Gap National Park. "If the Department of Interior holds fast to its federal 
mandate and all the laws governing National Parks prevail, these 72,000 acres will always be the 
pride of America, along with more than 200 other federal park treasures. Those of us who were 
left to relocate to places away from and outside of the park still have our grand memories of the 
'good life' when traffic was nil, there was an absence of noise, real tranquility existed and 
paddling on a river was close to heaven."129 
Postscript 
Jean Zipser lived in an early 18th century structure that was one of the first European 
houses built in the Minisink Valley. She was born in that house and lived there most of her short 
57-year life. Zipser was the last mayor of Pahaquarry when the former mining town had 
129 Interview with Nancy Shukaitis by Kathleen Duca-Sandberg, February, 23,2011. 
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dwindled to a total population of two. She and the other town resident finally gave up and 
allowed Pahaquarry to be absorbed into the neighboring Township of Hardyston. This was one 
of the first and only times two municipalities have merged in New Jersey. Zipser had worried 
that when she died, her ancestral home, which she eventually had to rent from the National Park 
Service, would also disappear. A personal friend and fellow journalist, Zipser had staunchly 
fought against the dam and was a militant defender of preserving the few remaining historic 
buildings that were now part of the national park. "Congress and the president can talk about 
preserving history, but until they are willing to put up the money, our history will die," she had 
written a few years before she was killed in a single car accident on an icy stretch of poorly 
maintained, federally owned, Old Mine Road, where this history began. 
APPENDIX 
TOCKS ISLAND DAM PROJECT TIMELINE 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania sign The Anti-Dam Treaty of 1783 and determine 
river island ownership. The Delaware River is considered a common highway and 
no dams are allowed. 
Lehigh Canal opens and others follow supporting Industrial Revolution demands 
for coal. The population explodes and water supply demands increase dramatically. 
The Delaware River Development Company is incorporated in New Jersey and 
creates the first plans for a dam on the Delaware River. 
New York builds New Croton Dam on the Delaware's headwaters. 
1907-1928 the Catskill System is built to supply New York City. 
The lumber rafting industry has ended on the river. 
The Pennsylvania Water and Power Resources Board proposed a dam at Walpack 
Bend. 
The Delaware River Treaty (Tri-State) Commission was created by New Jersey, 
New York and Pennsylvania to equally share the river's water and maintain 
minimum flow. 
New Jersey sues New York and New York City over Delaware River water rights. 
The US Supreme Court rules on the Delaware River Case. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes affirmed each state in the Delaware River Basin has a right to a fair share of 
the river's water. 
The French Army was defeated at Dien Bien Phu. The United States sends advisors 
to Vietnam. 
Pennsylvania began studying a Delaware River dam site at Walpack. 
Two devastating hurricanes caused record floods along the Delaware in August. 
The US Army Corps begins a major study of the Delaware River basin. 
The Delaware River Basin Advisory Committee is created. 
The Army Corps picks Tocks Island as their preferred site for a dam on the 
Delaware. 
The Delaware River Basin Compact was adopted by four states and the federal 
government. 
Tocks Island Dam and upper pumped water storage plans a t  Yards Creek were 
finalized. 
Power companies purchase land including Sunfish Pond from New Jersey and plans 
are made to use it for pumped storage to generate electricity. 
Tocks Island Dam is authorized by Congress with an estimated cost of $90 million. 
There were 11,000 American troops in Viet Nam. 
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased an additional $16 million. 
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area was established around the 
proposed Tocks Lake. The dam would have created a recreational lake surrounded 
by a National Park. Water and recreation are measured into a cost-benefit ratio. 
There were 150,000 American troops in Viet Nam. 
The Army Corps received $1.2 million funding for Tocks but the project start was 
way behind. President Johnson starts facing funding shortages because of the War  
in Viet Nam. The Lenni Lenape League was formed to oppose a pumped-storage 
facility that would destroy Sunfish Pond and this attracts attention to Tocks Island 
Dam. 
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased to $198 million. 
Zme Magazine blasted President Johnson for unnecessary spending on Tocks 
Island Dam. Congress appropriated $4 million for Tocks but the Army Corps 
budget was reduced. Justice William Douglas hikes to Sunfish Pond in support of its 
preservation. 
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased to $203 million. 
Johnson began cutting his $4.6 billion public works budget and grappled with 
imposing a 10 percent tax surcharge to help pay for the war. Inflation is out of 
control. There were 534,700 American troops in Vietnam. Congress appropriated 
only $3.88 million to the Army Corps for Tocks, but that was cut an additional $1.83 
million by the Revenue and Expenditure Act. The project is way behind schedule. 
Estimated Tocks Island Dam project costs increased to $214 million. 
Congress called for a new evaluation of the Tocks Island Dam Project and funding 
was again delayed. The General Accounting Office determined the dam's water 
supply benefit was underestimated while the recreational benefits of the dam and 
lake were over-estimated by the Army Corps. Only seven percent of the necessary 
land had been acquired for the Tocks Project and there were no construction 
contracts in place yet. 
President Nixon signs the National Environmental Policy Act. The Army Corps was 
then required to file an environmental impact statement on Tocks Island Dam. 
The Vietnam War scaled down, but Nixon cut his public works spending. 
Tocks Dam is delayed because an incomplete environmental impact statement was 
submitted by the Army Corps. Save the Delaware Coalition was formed uniting 
dozens of organizations to fight the dam. 
New Jersey Governor Cahill demands conditions be met for NJ's continued support 
of the dam, including a reduction of anticipated annual park visitors from 10.5 
million to 4 million, which greatly diminished mandatory project revenue benefits. 
1974 Congress appropriates funds for an impartial new environmental impact study on 
the Tocks Island Dam and stipulates no money be spent on construction or land 
acquisition until this study is completed. New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne has a 
team of environmentalists privately study the project. 
1975 The estimated cost to build Tocks Island Dam increased to $400 million and kept 
climbing. Delaware River Basin Commission votes 3 to 1 against construction of 
Tocks Island Dam. The War in Vietnam is over. 
1978 A major section of the Delaware River becomes part of the National Wild and 
Scenic Rivers System, effectively blocking future dams. 
1983 A Good Faith Agreement was reached by all parties to the US Supreme Court Case 
of 1931 and was adopted by the Delaware River Basin Commission. 
1986 The Water Resource Development Act reforms and modernizes the Army Corps of 
Engineers. No more funds are spent on the dam. 
1992 Congress de-authorizes Tocks Island Dam, but retains the option to revisit the issue 
if deemed necessary in the future. The Delaware River Basin Commission begins 
searching for alternate water sources. 
2008 A bill is passed to reauthorize the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area 
Citizens Advisory Commission through 2018. 
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Jersey Department of Environmental Protection under Gvvernor Cahill, who wantcd to 
participate, but was unable. 
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